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THE LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
VA Vehicles and other automotives
GDP Gross Domestic Product
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PIT Personal Income Tax
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1. INTRODUCTION: RESEACRH OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of the research is to analyze and assess the current policy 
environment of decentralization and the state of affairs of ensuring the process 
through budgeting. Based on the assessment, it aims to propose options for a 
local budgeting policy that is sustainable and predictable and that would produce 
budget revenues for independent local expenditure. For this purpose, the work 
makes an attempt to give answers to the following policy question: 
“Does the current budget and finance system enable  formation of a 
predictable, independent, fair and equitable budget that is sufficient for 
the local community?”
In other words, it will answer  questions whether the local budget is: 
(i) Adequate, i.e. sufficient in order to fulfill the mandated functions;
(ii) Independent, i.e.  transparent in terms of subsidy and revenue allocation; 
explicitly managed; authorized with power and opportunities to administer 
independently the recurrent budget;
(iii) Equitable, i.e. equal in terms of per capita budget revenue and expenditure 
for all administrative units;
(iv) Predictable, i.e.  the principles of allocation of subsidies and revenues 
are guaranteed and fully applied.
Within the framework of the above key issue, the following four areas of research 
were identified:
• Whether the aimag and soum budget is autonomous in terms of planning 
and expenditure?
• Whether the tax and other revenues of the local budget are sufficient for 
fulfilling the functions mandated by law?
• Which type of tax revenues shall be the major component of the local 
budget revenue formation?
• Whether financial support from the central budget will become a major 
component of the local budget revenue?
 In the frame of the research, the authors carried out a vertical and horizontal 
analysis  and an assessment of  the aimag and soum tax revenues based on the 
2006 and 2007 local budget implementation and the revised 2008 budget. The 
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study  covered  budget data from 21 aimags and the capital city. Considering 
specifics of each region, a selective research was carried out in Khentii, Orkhon, 
Bayan-Ulgii and South Gobi provinces . Furthermore, one central soum and one 
peripheral soum were chosen from each province for a sampling research.
In order to determine the local tax authority, an analysis of legislation related to 6 
kinds of aimag and 12 kinds of soum taxes was carried out and conclusions were 
made.  Methods used in research included study of present laws, Government 
and CRH resolutions, meetings with related officials and representatives of 
related institutions, data collection in aimags and soums, discussions as well as 
qualitative methods.
The research has resulted in study and analysis of the tax authority and amount 
in each type of taxes, the conclusions of which are presented in Chapter 2 of the 
Report. The Chapter 3 presents the analysis of the local budget revenues in each 
of the tax revenues and the income growth, contraction and their reasons by the 
samples of the budget reports of the selected aimags. Chapter 4 of the Report 
deals with the issues of sufficiency of the local budget revenues , existence of 
a sustainable  tax revenue base, of disparities  between the urban and rural 
administrative units, of autonomous  local taxation. Research outcomes are 
consolidated  at the  aimag and soum levels. Current principles of distribution of 
the central financial support among the local administrative units are examined 
in Chapter 5. Policy recommendations for rationalization of the central and local 
budget revenue allocations are presented in Chapter 6. The last or Chapter 7 
suggests the ways of implementation of the above recommendations.
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2. STUDY OF AUTHORITY IN THE LOCAL BUDGET REVENUE
The local budget revenue allocation requires the following universal principles 
to be ensured:
(i) The local government shall have adequate/sufficient sources for financing 
the services to be provided within its competence;
(ii) A priority should be given to  collection of local budget revenues from 
within the local population and other tax payers and to  matching of the 
revenue collection with  efficiency of the local public services;
(iii) It should be predictable, i.e.  principles of revenue allocation to the local 
administrations shall be clear, guaranteed by law and immune to arbitrary 
distortions;
(iv) A right to independent budget expenditure in the interests of the local 
community shall be respected.
Basic principles of the public  finances stipulate that the local budget revenues 
of any country have  the following sources:
1. Local tax revenues
2. Payments and fees
3. Central government transfers (subsidies, assistance) 
4. and shared revenues
Each of these components plays substantial economic, political and social roles 
in the local budget.
Before talking about the local taxes, the theoretic definition of the term “local tax” 
should be given. The real local taxes are (i) levied by the local government1; (ii) 
rates of which are established by the local government; (iii) collected by the local 
government itself; and (iv) revenues from which are accumulated into the local 
budget (Bird, 2000-2005 ). However, in reality many taxes might embody one or 
two of these characteristics and the “owner” of those taxes might be unclear.
1 A local government is understood to be a body elected through democratic elections by the population 
belonging to the respective administrative unit. In the case of Mongolia, it is a Hural of the Citizens’ 
Representatives.
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For example, while in many countries a certain portion of the tax revenues stays 
at the local area ,  their rates are established, they are levied and collected by 
the central government. Such taxes are better considered as central government 
shared taxes,  linked to transfers channeled to the local administrations. In other 
words, the taxing authority is shared by the local and the central government. 
There is certain ground for explaining it in this way because of the loose correlation 
between the local tax collection and the transfer revenues.
When the tax collection is in the hands of the central government, i.e. when 
there is a unified tax collection system, it is more effective, in economic as well 
as  professional aspects. A decentralized tax collection system administered 
by each individual local government will, firstly, increase the administrative 
expenses2; and, secondly, complicate  organization of the professional tax 
collecting activities.since in terms of training and methodology, an independent 
performance by the local administration is considered to be of a lower quality 
and less efficient. It should be kept in mind that having a unified tax collection 
system does not limit the rights of the local government to levy a tax, establish 
a tax rate, set  the tax reliefs and collect revenues. An issue of who holds the 
political responsibility to establish the tax rate is the most important part of the 
local tax authority.
Taxes are divided as real estate, excise, personal income, utility, corporate, 
natural resources taxes.
Countries would channel some of these taxes into the central budget, some – to 
the local budgets, some – to both budgets (shared taxes).
Taxes that generate a large amount of revenues and that are universally and 
equally applied on the whole territory of a country, such as corporate income 
tax, import tariffs, VAT, and excise taxes, are overwhelmingly mobilized into the 
central budget in order to ensure the macroeconomic stability.  They acquire a 
special economic significance especially at a time of crisis, instability and natural 
calamity. However, some countries have a practice of sharing the proceeds from 
these taxes with the local communities. Let us now  examine some taxes that 
contribute to the local budget revenues.
Immovable property, i.e. Real Estate Taxes are traditionally considered  the 
most reliable source of local taxation. Since real estates are visible and tangible, 
the respective tax collection and revenue generation tend to be easy. However, 
the tax base and the valuation of real estates in the developed nations have 
become complicated and disputable. On the other hand, since the real estate 
2 An independent tax collection system at each administrative unit limits the potential to reduce the 
recurrent expenses related to the operation.
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tax is paid only once a year, even a minor increase in the tax rate might cause 
dissatisfaction. Therefore, the local politicians have now less interest in meddling 
with real estate taxes. Though politically sensitive, such taxes established by a 
universal rule continue to take an important place in the local budget.
Excise Taxes, the rates of which are best to be established by the local 
administration in terms of the economic benefits, are related to the transportation 
facilities. Fuel taxes, vehicle taxes and road tolls are examples of such taxes. 
Local road amortization and impact of pollution caused by fuel consumption are 
in greater measure concerns  for  the local towns and communities.
Personal Income Taxes are, as  experience of other countries show, transparent 
and in political aspect  consistent with the principle of citizens’ responsibility, and, 
thus, play a respective role in the local budget revenues. In the Scandinavian 
countries, the local authorities levy an additional  percentage on the top of the 
general personal income taxes established by the central government and 
channel it to the local budget. In the transitional economies the local budget is 
formed by allocation of a certain percentage from the general personal income 
tax revenues. This percentage, for example, is 50% in Bulgaria and 30% in 
Poland. The local authorities in these countries do not have power to levy local 
personal income taxes or to establish the PIT rates. Therefore, these revenues 
are considered  transfers redistributed from the central government revenues. 
The transfer of VAT practiced in Mongolia is similar. Many countries are at 
present  considering introduction of a local percentage  in addition to the general 
personal income tax.
Consumption Taxes belong to the types that are capable of creating efficient 
and flexible sources of income at the local level. Most countries apply a VAT 
which is one of these types of tax. Most central governments have the power to 
levy the VAT and to establish its rates. A part of the revenues then is allocated 
to the local government. There  is an opinion that they should considered to 
be local taxes since tey are related to consumption of  the local population. 
However, such a local taxation might impair the macroeconomic control and 
the responsibility to levy and collect taxes and might stimulate local authorities 
for tax exporting. Therefore, it is preferable to leave the VAT in the hands of the 
central government. Canada, Brazil and some other federal countries apply VAT 
at the local level.
Business Taxes include corporate income taxes, property taxes, patent and 
license fees,  and others. Though local authorities are interested in  levying 
these taxes, economists and researchers consider such local taxation  to be 
able to create a macroeconomic distortion. However, in practice, these taxes 
belong to the central government budget taxes. 
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Local authorities fight for Taxes on Natural Resources to be in their power. 
However, this fight is repelled on the basis of several reasons. 
First, uneven distribution of  natural resources, especially minerals, among 
various regions will lead to an increased  disparity between them, if the natural 
resources taxation is given to the local administration.
Second, revenues from  natural resources are not sustainable and will cease to 
exist after a certain time, because the resources are not renewable. Therefore, 
they cannot be permanent sources. When the revenues  stop, then the artificially 
increased expenditure  will not get financing.
Third,  rehabilitation of natural environment is costly, and if not carried out, the 
indigenous population will suffer. In addition, the local authorities lack professional 
and political capacity to rehabilitate it on their own.
Fourth, it is advised that revenue proceeds from the natural resources taxes 
should be appropriated into the central budget and used for national development 
priorities and investments.
Fifth, large tax payers together with the local authorities might conspire to launch 
various programs and projects that may lead to indirect corruption. Therefore, 
such taxes should be centralized. 
Payment and fees for services are among the most potential income sources 
that the local government can use best. It is considered appropriate for the local 
authorities to charge adequate payment and fees for the services provided to the 
citizens. In economic terms, the payment and fees carry market information on 
the demand and need for the public sector services and on the basis of meeting 
demand of population and sharing expences effectiveness increases.
Local governments charge small fees and payment for services like licensing, 
documentation of citizen’s identity and vehicle registration, notary and copying 
of documents. Most of these charges do not generate sufficient revenues. 
Establishment of a realistic rate of charge is also questionable.
Many countries are looking for a simple, realistic system of fewer charges based 
on careful calculations to replace the current system of numerous , cumbersome 
charges for public services.
Chapter 5 deals with the  mechanism of transfers   from the state budget in more 
detail.
The respective laws of Mongolia stipulate that the aimag budget revenues shall 
consist of 6 types of tax and the soum budget revenues – of 12 types3. Research 
3 Article 7.4, General Tax Law; Articles 10.1 and 10.2, Law on Central Budget
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has been done in the frame of the mandates of taxation, establishment of tax 
rates, tax discount and exemption, tax distribution and reporting with an aim to 
make a conclusion whether these types of taxes have characteristics of local 
budget revenues. The local budget revenues were classified at aimag and soum 
levels andeach type was codified to avoid duplication and misinterpretation.
Central Government Taxes  - (U1, U2, …Un)
Aimag Taxes   - (A1, A2, …An)
Soum Taxes   - (S1, S2, …Sn)
The study of the tax authority covers the existing laws of Mongolia, Government 
resolutions, decrees and decisions of ministers and heads of agencies, 
resolutions of the Citizens’ Representatives Hural, decrees of governors. Also 
interviews of respective officials of the selected aimags were carried out to 
analyze  implementation of laws and decisions, evaluate the taxation authority 
and  identify challenging  issues.
2.1 AIMAG TAXATION AUTHORITY
The Law of Mongolia on the Central Budget stipulates that the revenues of aimags, 
the capital city, soums and districts consist of tax and non-tax incomes.
The tax revenues for aimag and the capital identified in Article 10.1 of the above 
Law include:
1. Real estate tax
2. Municipal tax
3. Royalty for minerals (20%)
4. Land fee
5. Vehicles and other automotives taxes
6. License fees for mineral exploration (25%).
The aimag and capital city revenues of non-tax nature4 consist of:
• Payment for usage and proceeds from sale of local properties, interests, 
fines
• Dividends from shares belonging to local government in the entities and 
organizations with local government ownership
• Financing of procurement of goods ordered by the central budget 
administrator
• Other incomes to be appropriated into the aimag and capital city budgets 
in accordance with legislation.
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Most countries, where  decentralization has succeeded, possess such 
characteristics as  predictability of local budget revenues, the power of the local 
administration to establish its own tax rates, the adequate and equitable income 
generation.
Each type of aimag and capital city tax revenues is analyzed below by factors 
such as taxation, tax rates, tax concession and exemption, procedures of tax 
collection and reporting, and tax revenue allocation taken as criteria in order to 
determine its authority.
In determining full authority of local aimag and capital city administrative 
organizations on the issue of taxation primary and secondary data such as 
legislation and rules of respective aimags, and interviews with the senior officials 
and professionals from the aimags of Khentii, Orkhon, Bayan-Ulgii and South 
Gobi has been used.
Immovable property/Real Estate Tax (A1)
Tax Levy 
The Law of 2000 on Real Estate Tax (RET Law) regulates  taxation of immovable 
properties. Immovable properties include buildings and land plots owned by 
citizens.
The real estate tax rates are established by legislative acts approved by 
the Parliament. Local authorities have no right to establish, change or apply 
concessions to the rates.
Aimags such as Khentii and Bayan-Ulgii have seen recently construction of many 
private houses with commercial service designation5. Taxation of such buildings 
faces difficulties, because private houses are exempt from taxation by law, while 
buildings with commercial designation are to be taxed. Therefore, in most cases 
tax inspectors conduct their own assessment and charge the real estate tax on 
the commercial part of the building.
The real estate tax is charged on local immovable properties. Its rate does not 
depend on profitability of citizens and business entities. The registry of and 
change in immovable properties are transparent in local settings. Therefore, the 
local administration can fully forecast the expected size of revenues from this 
type of taxation.
4 Article 10.2, Law on Central Budget
5 Ground floors are built for running shops, restaurants or bars
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Tax Rate
The annual tax is levied on the real estate at rate of 0.6% of its market value. 
The provisions of establishing the rate, discounting and exempting for the tax 
are stipulated by the RET Law approved by the Parliament. The local authorities 
have no right  to reduce, discount and exempt the tax. 
Tax Concession and Exemption
Articles 6 and 7 of the RET Law provide for tax concessions. Private dwellings, 
public buildings and buildings of entities financed by government and local 
budgets are exempted fully from taxation.
Land plots owned by citizens for family use  enjoy a tax concession of 95-98%, 
varying as for the capital city or aimag or soum; lands for other designations – of 
30-85%, varying as for the capital or aimag or soum, and crop farming lands – of 
95%.
The land plot of 0.07 hectare, which is given into proprietorship  free of charge 
to  every Mongolian citizen is  96-98% exempt from the real estate tax. Thus, the 
tax revenue from a household  is  minimal6. Paying a tax of MNT 40 , in addition 
to the cost of a bank transfer form at MNT100, is too negligible especially since 
expenditure the government is to bear collecting these taxes would far surpass 
the revenue.
Tax Distribution and Reporting
The taxpayer shall report on his/her real estate tax to the local tax authority by 
10 February each year and transfer the annual payment by 15 February.
The real estate tax on land is levied by the respective land management authority. 
A tax officer shall collect the tax and make the payment to the local budget. In 
Orkhon aimag, however, the land management authority itself levies and collects 
the tax.
This tax is not channeled to the central government budget, but is fully used by 
the aimag budget. The real estate tax payment at a soum level is also channeled 
to the aimag budget.
6 See Attachment #10 for calculations of real estate taxes.
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Municipal Tax (A2)
Though the Article 10.1.1  of the Law on Budget stipulates  for this tax, no 
regulations for its collection are in place in Ulaanbaatar or  any aimag. In other 
words, this type of tax is not applied.
Royalty on Minerals (A3 and C12)
Authority of Taxation
This tax is of a type shared among the central, aimag and soum budgets. Its 
rate is established by the law (Law on Minerals) adopted by the Parliament. 
Levying and collecting are the prerogative of the local authorities. The respective 
relationship is governed by the New Edition of 2006 of the Law on Minerals. 
The owner of a license on minerals shall pay a royalty on the sale’s amount 
of all minerals extracted, sold and shipped for sale from the mines. The local 
government does not have the right to establish or to change the rate or to apply 
concession or exemption on the royalty. Only the Central Government has such 
a right.
The royalty charged on minerals produced at the Erdenet Copper Mine of Orkhon 
aimag, the Khurmen and Tavantolgoi Coal Mines of South Gobi aimag, the Bor-
Undur Fluorspar Mine and Berkh Mine of Khentii aimag, and some others, is 
collected into the local budget. Bayan-Ulgii aimag, which imports its coal supply 
from Uvs aimag, has an income of MNT 38.6 million only from minerals royalty 
payment, lower  compared to other aimags.
Since the local authority conducts a general registry of respective business 
entities and has the power to supervise, this type of taxation can be considered 
a predictable local tax revenue.
Tax rate
A rate of 2.5% on sales value of coal and other general purpose minerals and 
a rate of 5.0% on sales value of all other minerals (Article 32.3) are charged 
as royalty. As the Law on Minerals stipulates, 70%, 20% and 10% of all royalty 
proceeds are channeled, respectively, to the central, aimag and soum budgets.
Tax Concession and Exemption
The Law does not regulate the authority for tax concession and exemption.
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Tax Distribution and Reporting
“Rules of payment and distribution of royalty on minerals”7 stipulate that license 
holders shall pay the royalty with regard to gold, copper and copper concentrate 
to the central budget within 21 days from the date of sales transaction or shipment, 
and with regard to other minerals – to the aimag, the capital city or soum (district) 
budgets within 10 days from the date of sales transaction or shipment.
30% of the amount of royalty payment on gold, copper and copper concentrate 
accrued to the central budget within the respective month shall be channeled by 
the Finance Ministry from the central government account to the account of the 
respective aimag or the capital city, where the said mineral deposits are located, 
by the 25th  of the following month.
70% of the amount of royalty payment on minerals other than gold, copper and 
copper concentrate accrued to the local budget during the given month shall 
be transferred to the central budget by the 30th  of the following month by the 
respective local budget authorities, where the deposits are located.
The respective share of the amount of the royalty payment distributed from the 
central budget to the aimag (the capital city) budget shall be further channeled 
within 10 business days to the soum (district) budget, where the deposits are 
located.
Land Fee (A4)
Tax Levy
The Law on Land Fees adopted in April 1997 regulates the land fee relations. 
Citizens and entities that use land shall pay a land fee.
The land fee is calculated based on the basic land value. The annexes to 
the Government Resolution #152 of 1997 regulate this relationship. The local 
authorities establish the detailed land fee rates on the basis of the above 
Government Resolution.
Land registration, distribution and fee collection are carried out by the local 
administration. Therefore, the land fee revenue is predictable. Current practices 
of establishment of land fee rates suggest that rates are higher8 in places with a 
higher concentration of the population.
7 Government Resolution #272 of 2006
8 At the maximum level allowed by law.
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Land Fee Rate and Size
The Law on Land Fees establishes the land fee calculation indicators as 
follows:
A. For pasture lands, per head of domestic animals, converted to sheep, as 
a percentage of the base land unit value, but a maximum of 0.01-0.03% 
of pasture land fee.
B. MNT 1,500-7,500 per kilometer of infrastructure lines as stipulated by in 
Article 13 of Law on Land.
C. For crop farming and animal fodder lands, a maximum of 0.01-0.03% of 
per hectare land fee.
D. 0.1-1.0% of per hectare land fee for cities, towns and other urban areas.
E. A maximum of 0.01-0.03% of per hectare base land value in other 
cases.
The land fee is a local tax, where the local authorities have the right and 
considerable independence to establish the final rates within the framework of 
existing legislation.
Tax Concession and Exemption
The Article 8.1 of the Law in its stipulates that the following taxpayers will be 
exempt from the following land fees:
A. Herder households  – from pasture and animal fodder land fees;
B. Citizens of Mongolia, who own land for a family use  – an exemption of 
90% of fee for a plot of 0.07 hectare;
C. Citizens and entities of Mongolia – from state border land fees;
D. Citizens of Mongolia – from fees for  land with natural, historic and cultural 
heritage, which he/she is entitled to preserve and protect;
E. State-registered nursing homes and all educational institutions of public 
and private ownership – from fees of land they operate on;
F. Citizens and entities – 5-year exemption for lands they use for perennial 
and leguminous plants in order to improve the soil quality and to transfer 
it to pasture;
G. Unions of apartment owners – from fees on ground land used upon 
contract;
H. The Government may grant concessions to citizens and entities that 
apply eco-friendly and land protection and rehabilitation technologies;
I. An exemption is applied to lands, where perennial plants and fruits and 
berries are planted for the first time until the first commercial crops are 
harvested.
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Article 8.2 of the Law stipulates that the Government may grant concessions to 
citizens and entities that apply eco-friendly and land protection and rehabilitation 
technologies. In those 4 aimags, where studies were carried out, no entity was using 
concessions from the Government.
Tax Distribution and Reporting
In Ulaanbaatar City, Orkhon aimag and other urban areas the authorities in charge 
of land fee levy and collect the fees. In most other aimags, the land authorities 
levy the fees, but the local taxation authorities collect and supervise.
The land fee payer, unless otherwise stipulated in the land ownership and usage 
contract, shall pay the annual fee in 4 equal installments within the first 25th day 
of each quarter. Fees for subsequent quarters can be paid in advance.
Revenues from land fees shall be collected into aimag and capital city budgets. 
A certain part of the revenues shall be used for protection, rehabilitation and 
management works of state-owned lands. 
Vehicle and Other Automotive Taxes (A5)
Tax Levy
The Law of 1992 on Vehicle and other automotive taxation regulates this type of 
tax. This is a universal tax levied on all vehicles and other automotives possessed 
by entities and private citizens. This is applied to all transport vehicles, buses, 
motorbikes, special-purpose vehicles, agricultural and construction machinery, 
trailers.
Since the registry and certification are handled by the local transport police, the 
present number and growth in number of vehicles are easily registered, and the 
tax revenues are directly accrued to the local budget, so the revenue pattern is 
predictable.
Tax Rate
The tax is different as for Ulaanbaatar, Darkhan and Orkhon, and other regions. 
The amount of taxes on passenger cars depend on their engine capacity, and on 
commercial vehicles – on their weight capacity9.
The last revision of the vehicle taxes was made in 1997. Since then the rates 
have not changed for 12 years.
9 See Annex #4
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Tax Concession and Exemption
No concession or exemption is applied.
Tax Distribution and Reporting
Citizens and entities pay their annual taxes once a year before June 1 to 
respective taxation authorities. When the annual vehicle inspection is launched, 
the tax revenue starts to flow to the budget.
The organization in charge of traffic control assists the taxation authorities 
in collecting the taxes on vehicles and other automotives. The tax revenue is 
collected into the respective aimag budget.
When there is  a large fleet of vehicles and automotives at  remote mines, the 
aimag sends a team to inspect and collect taxes on these vehicles on site and 
reports in the “Tax Division” column of Tax Reporting of Vehicles and Other 
Automotives.
License Fees for Mineral Exploration and Mining (A6 and C11)
Tax Levy
This is a shared tax, the rate of which is established by the Law on Minerals 
approved by the Parliament. The Government regulates the tax collection and 
revenue distribution10. The taxation in this field creates difficulties in terms of its 
redistribution  to local governments. In other words, the central administrative 
body in charge of Geology and Geography issues collects the tax revenues and 
transfers them to the Finance Ministry, which redistributes the proceeds. The 
local governments have only a right to make a proposal. This situation leads to 
an incomplete distribution of the planned income for the local governments. For 
example, South Gobi aimag had a plan to earn MNT 5 billion of income from the 
license fees in 2008,but the actual transfer amounted to MNT 2.4 billion only and 
the remaining MNT 2.6 billion was not paid. Furthermore, the 50% of MNT 2.4 
billion was not transferred to the respective soum, as required by law.
Tax Rate
The per hectare fee rate for exploration area is $0.1 in the first year, $0.2 – in 
the second year, $0.3 – in the third year, $1.0 for years 4-6, $1.5 – for years 7-9. 
The mining license fee is $15 per hectare in the licensed area. The fee for coal 
and other general-purpose minerals is $5.0 per hectare11. The Law on Minerals 
10 Government Resolution #272 of 2006; Finance Minister’s Decree #102 
11 §32.2, Law on Minerals
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stipulates that 50%, 25% and 25% of the respective license fee proceeds shall be 
collected, respectively, into the central, aimag (the capital city) and soum budgets.
Tax Concession and Exemption
There is no provision in legislation for concession and exemption in this 
category.
Tax Distribution and Reporting
As “the Regulation on Payment and Distribution of Royalties on Minerals”12 
requires, the exploration and mining license owners shall pay the first-year fee 
within 10 business days upon receipt of the invoice and the subsequent year’s 
fees in advance. The central state administrative body in charge of Geology and 
mining shall collect the fees, transfer the monthly revenue by the 25th to the state 
budget income account and report to the Finance Ministry in accordance with 
standards. The Finance Ministry, within 5 business days since the acceptance 
of of license fee revenue transferred by the central state administrative body in 
charge of Geology and mining, shall transfer it to aimag and capital city budget 
accounts. The aimag and capital city budget authorities shall further redistribute 
the required proceeds to soum and district budget within 3 business days since 
the date of receipt of the revenue transfer.
Despite the above regulation, the provisions seem to be not working. For example, 
South Gobi aimag received less than half of the proceeds from the license fee 
in 2008, and received it with a considerable delay. The aimag authorities also 
did not transfer the required shares to the respective soums, where  exploration 
and mining take place. The finance and policy coordination division staff of the 
aimag government justifies their inaction by absence of detailed information 
on the companies, that paid or  did not pay the license fees, which obstructs 
transfer of the allocation.
Such major functions as establishment of types and rates of tax revenues of 
aimags and their concession and exemption are prerogative of the Central 
Government as required by law. However, as for the land fees, the local authorities 
through the Citizens Representatives’ Hural can take decisions conducive to the 
local specifics, but within the limits of legislation.
The central state administrative body in charge of Geology and mining awards 
mining and exploration licenses, collects fees and redistributes the proceeds 
through the Finance Ministry to aimags and soums. It also redistributes the 
proceeds from royalties on gold, copper and copper concentrates through the 
12 Government Resolution #272 of 2006
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Finance Ministry to local governments. Taxation and collection of other taxes are 
mainly carried out by local taxation authorities and are allocated to respective 
budget accounts.
From  the aimag and capital city taxes as stipulated by the Law on Central 
Budget, the “municipal taxes” have  not yet been applied. The regulations and 
rules of their application have not been worked out.
The study of the aimag-level taxes leads to a conclusion that establishment of 
aimag taxation and its rates as well as granting of concession and exemption 
are heavily centralized in the Parliament and the Central Government. The local 
authorities have the duties only to levy, collect and report on taxes.
In other words, the tax autonomy of the local self-governing administration lacks 
a legal foundation as a whole.
2.2 SOUM TAXATION AUTHORITY
As was said above, 12 types of taxes shall form the tax revenue of the soum 
budget in accordance with the Law on Central Budget and the General Tax Law. 
In the current Chapter, these tax revenues  codified as C1, C2,…C12, are studied 
in detail within the soum authority to levy, establish the rate of, grant concession 
and exemption, to collect and report taxes.
“License fees for exploration and mining” under code C11 and “Royalty on 
minerals” under code C12 are tax revenues that, under the law13, are income to 
be shared between different levels of government. Therefore, their analysis is 
equivalent to that of corresponding aimag taxes (A6 and A3). In other words, the 
tax authority analysis of C11 and C12 can be derived from that of A6 and A3.
Personal Income Tax (C1)
Tax Levy
This tax income is difficult to be treated as autonomous local tax revenue since 
the sole authority to establish the tax and its rates and to grant concession and 
exemption rests upon the Parliament in accordance with the Personal Income 
Tax Law.
However, the right to impose tax is administered by the soum tax officers. An 
amendment of October 2008 to the Law on Central Budget (Article 10.1.7) 
introduced a provision  on appropriation of wages and salaries and similar 
13 Law on Minerals of 2006
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income in the aimag budget. Therefore, this tax is not anymore a local tax for 
soums assoums do not have any right to establish the tax and to change its rate. 
They are authorized only to impose and collect the tax for the budget.
It is also hard to predetermine the real tax revenue. In practice, this tax revenue 
is planned on the basis of the performance  in the previous year. No detailed 
planning based on a clear tax base is carried out. For example, in imposing the 
tax on operational income, the soum tax inspectors are not able to  document 
every activity of an individual or entity and face   great difficulties  due to incorrect 
or incomplete reports. On the other hand, individuals or taxpayers are often 
incapable  of writing a tax return report. Taxes on income of citizens with domestic 
animals are imposed on the basis of the animal population census data of the 
previous year14. Sudden natural calamities may cause death  of many animals, 
but the herdsmen might end up paying taxes on those  perished animals.
Tax Rate
There is no real opportunity for the local government to establish the personal 
income tax rate flexible enough (within binding limits) to match the local specifics. 
Once the Parliament establishes the personal income tax rates by law, the local 
authorities are denied the opportunity to apply a flexible policy to increase local tax 
revenues or to promote employment through adjustable rates. Article 8.1 of the Law 
on PIT stipulates for the following rates imposed on different types of income: 
Tax Concession and Exemption
The soum does not possess the authority to grant concession and exemption from 
this tax,  since such an authority belongs only to the Parliament in accordance 
with the law15. MNT 84,000 from the annual taxable income from wages, salaries 
and identical incomes are exempted from taxation. 20  heads of livestock 
converted to sheep  are tax-exempt per each member of herder’s  family. 50% 
of the income generated by farming of wheat grains, potatoes, vegetables, fruits 
and fodder plants are exempted from taxation.Tuition fees for undergraduate 
studies are also tax-free.
Though the above concessions and exemptions on certain types of income are 
defined for the purpose of national policy regulation, similar rights for a number of 
income types are missing at the soum level. Examples are the cases, when the 
personal income tax is levied on the number of domestic animals counted by the 
previous census. The number of  unexpectedly lost animals can be documented, 
but not exempted from taxation by the soum tax inspectors.
14 For example, the income tax is levied in May 2009 for animals counted by November 2008 census.
15 The income referred to in Article 16.1 of the Law on PIT is exempt from this tax.
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16 According to law, the tax collector shall appropriate the tax proceeds in the respective budget within 
the 10th of the next month. Herdsmen families and households with domestic animals are taxed twice 
a year and the proceeds shall enter the budget by 15 July and 15 December. Other taxpayers shall 
transfer the tax amount to the budget before the first 15th each quarter.
¹ Types of Taxes Rates
1 Wages, salaries, remuneration, bonus, and similar employment 
income
10%
2 Operational Income 10%
3 Capital Gains 10%
4 Capital Sales Tax 10%
5 Income of herdsmen and households with domestic animals 
(differing rates depending on regional specifics) in MNT
- The Capital City, Darkhan-Uul, Orkon, Selenge and Central 
aimags
- Arkhangai, Bayankhongor, Bulgan, Gobi-Sumber, Dornogobi, 
Dornod, Dundgobi,  Uvurkhangai, South Gobi, Sukhbaatar, 
Huvsgul, Khentii aimags
- Bayan-Ulgii, Gobi-Altai, Zavkhan, Uvs Khovd aimags 
- 100
- 75
- 50
6 Incomes from scientific, literary, art works; innovation, 
new products and profitable designs; organization of and 
participation in sports and artitistic performances,  and other 
similar incomes
2%
7 Income of prizes from artistic and sports contests and festivals 5%
8 Income from paid quizes, bets, lottery 40%
9 Indirect incomes 10%
Table 2.1 Personal Income Tax Rates
Tax Allocation and Reporting
The soum tax inspectors impose the personal income taxes and collect them 
directly to the soum budget revenue account in the State Fund16. Though 
taxpayers have  a dutiy to file their tax return and make the payment, in reality 
they are usually late and rely on tax inspectors to collect taxes. This is related in 
part to the  mentality and ethics of taxpayers.
In order to improve  effectiveness of tax collection and  efficiency of tax 
allocation, in Buyant soum of Bayan-Ulgii aimag, for example, the income tax 
proceeds from wages, salaries and identical incomes are appropriated in the 
soum budget, but only reported to the aimag authorities. The aimag would match 
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out the equivalent amount from the subsidies designated to that particular soum. 
This is an organizational method that may be used in aimags, where some parts 
of budget financing are subsidized.
The tax inspectors were observed to be using terminology different (used in their 
everyday work )  from the one defined in the law, when reporting on personal 
income tax collection. For example, words like a “patent”, sample tax, withholding 
are used. These might be common  language among the professionals, but they 
deviate from the substance of legal terms . While reporting on personal income, 
individuals have  few possibilities to document their income, hence the inaccurate 
information in the reports. Especially, the so called “sample tax”, which is derived 
from  taxation using methods for sample calculation approved by the Finance 
Minister, causes a lot of difficulties among citizens as they lack  report-writing 
skills.
Firearms Tax (C2)
Tax Levy
The taxation authority excludes the firearm tax from being a local tax. The Law 
on Firearm Tax regulates all taxation authority (except the imposition). The 
Parliament has the sole authority to establish the firearm tax and its rate and 
to grant concession and exemption. However, the right to impose the tax rests 
with soum tax inspectors. The soum tax inspectors impose the tax based on 
the firearm registration database collected from the soum police unit. The tax 
inspectors in Khentii aimag complained that the firearm tax income was not 
realistic due to  lack of coordination among state agencies and  incomplete 
registration of firearms.
If the police unit makes  true, complete registration of firearm , the respective tax 
revenue can be determined locally. However, the specifics of this type of tax limit 
the room for expansion of the tax base. Government policies on environment 
and hunting do not allow every citizen to own a firearm.
Tax Rate
The Law on Firearm Tax establishes the rate. MNT 4,000 is charged on shotgun 
and up to 6.4 mm -caliber gun, and MNT 6,000 – on all types of guns with caliber 
of 6.5 mm and above. These specific tax rates were introduced by the amended 
law of 1997 and do not reflect  present real values. Local authorities do not have 
power to re-adjust the tax rates to meet the local conditions.
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Tax Concession and Exemption
Article 5.2 of the Firearm Tax Law lists some types of firearm to be exempt 
from tax17. Also firearms owned by disabled or people without income may be 
exempted from taxation for a particular year by the respective soum (district) tax 
authorities.
In cases other than the above,  local governments do not have a legal right 
to grant an exemption. If the right to establish the firearm tax rates differently 
depending on  regions is given to local authorities, it may become an instrument 
of promotion for carrying out a local policy to protect nature and fauna. For 
example, citizens reported that wolves have become rare  in Khentii, while 
in South Gobi  their number has increased  dangerously..  However, the two 
aimags impose the same rate of tax. South Gobi aimag may grant a concession 
to firearm taxes in order to promote a policy on hunting wolves to reduce their 
population.. Unfortunately, local authorities lack power to change, reduce the 
rate or exempt from the tax.
Tax Distribution and Reporting
The firearm tax payment and distribution are organized in the following way. 
First of all, the respective local police unit will report to the tax authorities on 
registration and change of ownership of firearms by 15 February each year. 
Based on this report, local tax inspectors impose firearm taxes. The taxpayers 
will make the tax payment before 1 August each year to the local budget. The 
tax proceeds directly enter the local budget account, and therefore the income 
distribution and reporting go without any problems. However, tax inspectors 
have reported that the ownership database produced by the police tended to be 
incomplete.    
State Stamp Duty (C3)
Tax Levy
Types and rates of this tax are established by the Stamp Duty Law. Proceeds 
become a soum tax income source. Soum tax inspectors have a right to impose 
the duty. The government18 has the right to establish the visa fee rates for foreign 
citizens. Though it is a soum budget revenue source, the stamp duty has a 
limitation as an autonomous tax income.
17 - Firearms displayed in museum and artistic performance, or certified by police as unusable for hunting 
 - Firear ms used officially by environment guards;
 - Firearms used solely for sporting and training. 
18 Foreign Minister’s Decree #55 of 2002
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It is cumbersome to estimate in advance the expected amount of revenues from 
stamp duties to the soum budget. At present, the expected amount is planned 
on the basis of the previous year’s revenue. The tax base is difficult to identify in 
detail. The factors  influencing the tax imposition service are many and unstable, 
hence the uncertainty persists. 
Tax Rate
The Stamp Duty Law gives in detail  tax rates for every type of duties. For 
example, duties shall be charged on court settlement of legal disputes, notary 
services, registration of citizen’s marital status, issuance of passports, permits, 
visas, etc. Since the stamp duty types and rates are all detailed in law, only the 
Parliament shall have the right to make changes and amendments.
In many countries, as a rule, this type of tax authority belongs to local self-
governing administrations. In  our country, however, almost all public services 
are provided by the central government and ministries. Therefore, their fee 
rates are established by law.  However, the cost of providing a particular service 
is different  in different regions, and the local administration is best suited to 
manage the cost recovery.
Tax Concession and Exemption
The following court filings are exemp20 from fees:
• Claim on pension and welfare payment;
• Claim on patent and copyright;
• Claim by state organizations;
• Demand on tax payment, fees, penalties claimed by budget;
• Claim on issues to be considered upon petition.
The court may postpone or exempt or reduce the fees depending on the wealth 
of individuals, who have submitted the claims or petitions21. Fees are reduced by 
60%, when an individual  or a private entity requests for a patent validity of a new 
product or a new design, or for an extension of such patents. 
Tax Distribution and Reporting
As the Law on Stamp Duty requires, state bodies shall transfer fees for a particular 
type of service, when its amount reaches MNT 10,000, to the respective local 
budget. The annual report on fee collection shall be submitted to the State 
taxation authorities before 10 February every year.
20 Article 18, Stamp Duty Law
21 Article 18.3, Stamp Duty Law
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The state organizations, however, do not categorize their service fees and w 
transfer the total amount of all fees in a single transaction. Therefore, the taxation 
authorities have a report on only one transaction as a stamp duty payment, but 
not on each type of services provided.
In some cases, the fees paid may be returned (for example, the court has  a 
right to reimburse the fees paid to it). In such a case, the General Tax Authorities 
faces a substantial difficulty in deciding from which category of fee payment it 
should be  reimbursed.
Usage fee on hunting stock, permit fee for hunting or catching wild 
animals (C4)
Tax Levy
Local authorities have a limited power in defining and levying this type of tax 
income. The upper and lower band limits of tax rates are set by the Parliament, and 
the Government establishes the nominal fees within this band22. The Government 
also approved the regulation and instructions on a revenue collection for this 
type of tax by its Resolution 79 of 2008. Though there is an international practice 
for  the band limits to be established by the central government, the practice of 
the Mongolian Government to fix the fee rates and regulate the taxation process 
for the local administration (among them for soums) undermines  autonomy of 
the taxation authority.
The hunting stock of Mongolia is distributed unevenly throughout the regions and 
it is problematic to count and register the number of wild animals unlike that of 
livestock. Moreover, weakening control over protection of rare species might lead 
to their extinction. That is why the related tax income  varies in different regions. . 
It is also not a major tax base for local budgets. For example, the hunting-related 
fees for 2006 and 2007 constituted respectively only 0.5% and 0.3% of the local 
budget revenues. This share is not expected to increase, because  a ban on 
hunting a popular wild animal – marmots – is still in force.
Tax Rate
Paragraph 10.2.4 of the Law on Central Budget identifies this type of tax as 
“Usage fee on hunting stock, permit fee for hunting or catching wild animals”. 
These are two different types of tax. The Government revised these tax rates in 
2005 (see Appendix 1).
22 Government resolutions #248 (2005) and 264 (2001)
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However, local tax reports tend to present these two types of taxes, namely, 
“usage fee” and “permit fee”as one. On the one hand, it is related to the fact 
that payment from the Ministry of Environment is transferred under the name 
of “payment for hunting stock”, so it is unclear whether it is payment for 
hunted animals or fees for permission to hunt. O the other hand, it is related to 
inconsistency in terminology used in local tax revenue.  For instance, in 2008 tax 
reports of Bayanulgii and Hentii aimags  these fees were referred to as  “usage 
fee on hunting stock”, while in 2006 they were included under name of “income 
from hunting”.
The Parliament has the sole power to clarify and amend  terminology used in 
legislation, while only the Supreme Court has the authority to give its interpretation.
Tax Concession and Exemption
The Law on Hunting provides for an exemption of fees in the following cases:
• Catching  animals  with a purpose of their relocation and breeding;
• Organized  hunting and slaughtering of animals  with a purpose of 
destroying the infection focus;
• Hunting wolves in order to protect livestock herd  or to  reduce their 
excess population;
• Temporary catching for research purposes like blood sampling, 
measurement, labeling, ring-marking, attaching a scientific device.
The degree of concession is established by the Central Government, which is a 
provision that undermines the autonomy of local taxation. The Government might 
implement a policy to protect rare  animals and those under treat of extinction, 
but should not  indulge in extremes of granting concession and exemption of 
fees on every species  of wild animals.
Tax Distribution and Reporting
The fee payer shall pay the amount every time he/she gets the permit (license). 
The tax collector also every time shall transfer the fee amount to the soum 
(district) budget. The respective authorities shall present the annual report by 
10 January to the soum tax office; - by 15 January to the aimag (the capital) tax 
office; - by 1 February to the General State Tax Department. The latter shall 
consolidate the nation-wide report by 15 February.
According to the established regulations23, respective local officers shall transfer 
the collected fees to the local budget. However, the Ministry of Nature and 
23 Environment Minister’s Decree #32 of 2001
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Environment collects fees and payment for special permits or hunting permits 
issued to foreign citizens. This revenue finds its way to local budgets through 
many hurdles.
Exhibit 2.1 Special Hunting Permit
For example, a foreigner hunted  one Altai wild sheep in Buyant Soum of Bayan-
Ulgii Aimag in 2008. The hunting fee was $22,000 of which only $4,000 was paid 
to Buyant Soum.  However, it was paid after the Soum Governor had travelled 
to the capital and lodged a claim with the Ministry of Nature and Environment 
presenting a copy of the hunting license (see Exhibit 2.1) as a proof.
In accordance with Article 7.3 of the Law on Hunting Stock Payment, foreign 
citizens’ payment for  hunting a wild animal shall go to the central budget, while 
the hunting license fee shall be transferred to the soum (district) budget within 
15 days of  payment. However, this provision conflicts with §10.3.1 of the Law 
on Central Budget, where it says that “ payment for hunting a stock and the fee 
for license for hunting and catching wild animals” shall be appropriated into the 
soum (district) budget.
Permit fee for exploitation of natural resources other 
than minerals (C5)
Paragraphs 10.3.5, the Law on Central Budget, and 7.4.5, the General Taxation 
Law, stipulate for this provision. However, it is very vague on who will establish 
the authority and the amount and rate. Types of this tax are not defined and 
classified. Also it is unclear  whether the local governments have the right to 
establish the rate and grant concession and exemption for this type of fee.
Source: Tax report of Buyant soum, Bayan-Ulgii aimag
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Plant harvest charge (C6)
Tax Levy
The Law on Fees for Wild Plant Usage establishes the band of fee charges. 
Though the provision provides for the soum’s right to establish the fee, the aimag 
(the capital city) Citizens Representatives’ Hural (CRH) exercises it instead.
Although the aimag (the capital city) CRH has a right determine the tax income 
base and establish the tax rate, identification and collection of this type of tax 
income are not satisfactory at the local level. No tax income, for example, was 
registered for 2005-2007 as proceeding from the plant harvest charge.
Indifference of the local authorities with regard to identification and collection of 
this tax base is the reason for losing a certain tax income.
Tax Rate
The Parliament has established the lower and upper limits of this charge as 
follows. For a very  rare plant, the charge is between MNT 300 to 1,000,for a rare 
one – MNT 150-500,for a common plant – MNT 50-300. Though the aimag (the 
capital city) CRHs have the right to establish differential rates for plant harvest, 
there is no aimag, which has exercised this right and registered income there 
from. 
Tax Concession and Exemption
An exemption is granted by law to individuals, organizations and business 
entities, that utilize common plants, use  rare and common plants for research 
purposes, and harvest plants for animal fodder. There is a provision in the law24 
that the aimag (the capital city) CRH shall establish the conditions, requirements 
and rates of these charges taking into account the specifics of respective local 
territories. However, local authorities have not even identified the tax base and 
collection procedures. 
Tax Collection and Reporting
Each time when the plant usage license is obtained, the taxpayer shall pay the 
amount of charge in cash to the official appointed by the soum (district) Governor 
or in a bank transfer to the soum (district) budget. The official appointed by the 
Governor shall deposit the cash received to the budget account. He/she shall 
also present the report of the tax collection to the soum (district) tax authorities 
before 10 January the following year. The soum (district) and aimag (the capital 
24 §7.2, Law on Plant Harvest Charge
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city) reports shall be presented to the upper taxation authorities, respectively 
before 15 January and 1 February each year. The central taxation authorities 
shall consolidate the report by 15 February. The procedure of collection and 
reporting, thus, is in place, however, it is not observed by the local authorities 
that lack initiative and enthusiasm.
Firewood and Timber Stocking and Usage fees (C7)
Tax Levy
The Government establishes25 the rates and the power to grant concession and 
exemption within the band limits stipulated by law. The local authorities do not 
exercise the right except to levy and collect the fees. Therefore, it is difficult to 
include  this type of tax  into local tax income.
Depending on the regional specifics, aimags widely differ in terms of forest 
reserves, so  their tax bases vary. Local authorities are best suited to identify the 
tax base. Nevertheless, the highest instance decides everything, which makes 
the local initiative redundant. On the other hand, the forest reserve is shrinking 
rapidly and the reforestation works are slow, which means the related tax income 
cannot become a stable tax base.
Tax Rate
The rate of firewood and timber fees is established by the central government, 
not the local authorities (see Appendix  2).  
Tax Concession and Exemption
An exemption is granted when wood is cleaned for the purpose of protecting 
forestation lands and spring water sources, and when the forest guardian 
needs timber for building a work shelter. The concession is established by the 
Government26 in the following way:
Tax Distribution and Reporting
Entities, organizations and individual citizens shall pay the fees in cash to officials 
appointed by soum (district) governors or in bank transfer to soum (district) 
budget before obtaining the right to stock timber and firewood. The officials 
appointed by governors shall present the tax report to the soum taxation office 
by 10 January the following year. The soum report shall be forwarded to the 
25 Government Resolution #147 of 2005
26 Ibid.
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aimag (capital city) taxation authorities by 15 January. The aimag (capital city) 
report shall be presented to the central taxation authorities by 1 February. The 
latter shall consolidate the national report by 15 February. 
Exploitation fee for common minerals (C8)
Tax Levy
The central government ministries27 exercise the right to establish the types of 
this tax. The local authorities establish the rates of the tax. For example, the 
Khentii aimag CRH set up the tax rates by its Resolution #02 of 2004. The 
Bayankhutag Soum CRH also established the rates (its Resolution #31 of 2005). 
Since this is a tax designated for the soum budget, the Soum CRH decision was 
correct. However, when the aimag CRH has already set up the rates, the soum 
decision was redundant.
If the local authorities conduct a comprehensive study of this tax type, it may 
become possible to determine and calculate the size of potential income.
Tax Rate
The joint Decree #A/121/88 of 1998 by the ministers of Food and Agriculture 
and Nature and Environment stipulates for levying taxes on exploitation of brick 
clay, sand, gravel, quartzite, construction stones, lime, dolomite, volcano rock, 
freestone, and similar minerals.
Indicators Unit
Zones and 
Concession Rates
1 2 3 4
1  To stock tree stubs and fallen trees for firewood 
with a cleaning method
% 40 40 50 60
2  To collect fallen branches and twigs by cleaning:
1. For citizens and non-professional entities
    a/ coniferous trees
% 30 40 50 70
    b/ deciduous trees % 20 30 40 50
2. For professional timber entities for their own 
firewood and timber usage
% 20 30 40 60
3 To stock firewood and timber by  nursing forest 
aged above Class 2 of Age Classification
% 20 30 40 60
Table 2.2 Rates of Concession for Firewood and Timber Fees (in %)
27 Joint Decree #A/121/88 of 1998 of the Ministers of Food & Agriculture and Nature & Environment
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Varying tax rates are set up by the aimag, capital city CRH in accordance with 
law. For example, the South Gobi CRH has established the rates (see Annex 3) 
by its Resolution #9/5 of 2007.
Tax Concession and Exemption
Though the rates are established by the aimag CRH, there are no provisions on 
granting concession and exemption. The soum authorities do not possess the 
right on concession and exemption, which undermines the autonomy of soum 
taxation.
Tax Distribution and Reporting
Taxpayers shall pay the fees  at rates established by the aimag (capital city) 
CRH. The soum tax inspectors shall levy the exploitation fees and shall transfer 
the proceeds to the soum budget. Since the tax income is appropriated directly 
into the soum (district) budget, no complication arises in terms of distribution. 
Water and Mineral Water Usage Fee (C9)
Tax Levy
The right for and limits of tax concession  are established by law. The Government 
determines the rates for water usage fees within these limits. The aimag CRH has the 
right to set up the usage fees for mineral water. However, a fact that the government 
and the aimag CRH set up fee rates for soums undermines soum tax autonomy.
The water usage fee is a potential budget income generation tax in regions, 
where mining is thriving.  However, with exception of Ulaanbaatar, Darkhan and 
Uverkhangai, there are no aimags, where mineral water usage fees contribute to 
budget revenues. It is related to neglect  by local authorities of the need to determine 
the tax base and to collect respective fees.
In planning for tax income, the proceeds from the previous year become the base 
for calculations.
Tax Rates
The Government sets up the water usage fees28. Mineral water usage fees are 
established by aimag (capital city) CRH in accordance with law. However, Khentii, 
South Gobi and Bayan-Ulgii aimags do not have such practice. 
28 Government Resolution #7 of 2005
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¹ Designation of Water Usage Unit
Water Usage Fees
Surface 
Water
Underground 
Water
1 As percentage of revenues from 
production and services for usage of 
water in hydropower stations, water 
transportation, water sports, farming of 
common aquatic animals and plants
- 1.0 õóâü -
2 Heavy industry m3/MNT 20.0 30.0
3 Light industry m3/MNT 10.0 30.0
4 Mining
m3/MNT
  
-Gold and tin mining 80 100
-Oil mining, zinc and lead enrichment 80 100
-Copper concentrate, fluorspar 
enrichment 
80 100
5 Food production
m3/MNT
  
-non-alcoholic beverages 10.0 30.0
-others 10.0 30.0
6 Entities and citizens engaged in business 
production and services for profit
m3/MNT
  
1/In Ulaanbaatar, Darkhan and Erdenet 10.0 30.0
2/In aimag centers and other towns 
of Bayan-Ulgii, Khovd, Uvs, Huvsgul, 
Bulgan, Selenge, Tuv, Zavkhan, 
Arkhangai, Uverkhangai, Dornod, Khentii 
10.0 10.0
3/In aimag centers and other towns of 
Bayankhongor, Dornogobi, Dundgobi, 
Sukhbaatar, Gobi-Altai, South Gobi
10.0 30.0
Table 2.3 Water Usage Fees
Tax Concession and Exemption
An exemption is granted when water is used for drinking and household purposes, 
for watering of domestic animals and irrigation of household vegetable and crops 
plots, for fighting fire and other natural calamities, also in case of re-usage of 
water for production.
The law also contains a provision29 for the Government to grant concession in 
cases when water is purified before  use or is used for protection and breeding 
of wildlife, for planting different  plants in order to restore  natural resources.
29 §8.2 of Law on Water and Mineral Water Usage Fees
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With regard to mineral water usage, the local authorities have a right to grant 
concession and exemption, which is rarely exercised since issues of determining 
and levying the tax have not been resolved.
Tax Distribution and Reporting
Payers of water and mineral water usage fees shall determine themselves the 
amount of monthly fee and deposit it to the local budget before the 10th of next 
month. They shall also consolidate the annual report by 10 January each year 
and file a tax return. Soum (district) tax inspectors shall supervise this process. 
The inspectors shall report on soum (district) tax income by 10 January to the 
soum (district) tax authorities that  in turn shall report to aimag instances by 15 
January. The aimag (capital city) tax authorities shall present their reports to the 
central taxation department by 1 February. The latter shall consolidate the report 
by 15 February.
Though the taxpayers shall determine their taxable income, in practice there 
are many discrepancies in filing and reporting. The taxpayers often fail their 
responsibilities. Therefore, collection and reporting on water usage fees is 
usually complicated.
Personal income tax on street vendors and small 
businesses (C10)
Tax Levy
This is a part of the personal income tax. All taxation authority in this respect 
belongs to the Parliament. The levying and collection rights, however, remain with 
the local government. Therefore, this type of tax income cannot be considered 
purely an autonomous local tax source.
In practice, the planning for this revenue source is based on the actual proceeds 
from the previous year, because it is difficult to pre-determine the tax in advance. 
This tax consists of types of tax revenue (called a patent tax) established by 
law and model types of tax revenue identified by the Finance Ministry (called a 
sample tax). Since individuals often do not have skills  to file and report on their 
taxable income, such problems as late submission of reports etc take place and 
it is difficult for local authorities to determine the tax base and plan for revenue 
size.
Tax Rates
Monthly rates for personal income tax on street vendors and small businesses 
whose production and services can not be categorized for the tax purposes are 
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established by law30 (see Appendix 4). These types of related taxes are called 
and reported by inspectors as “Patent Tax”.
Model taxes on production and services,  not regulated by contracts with entities, 
organizations and individuals, are established by the Finance Minister’s Decree 55 
of 2002. These taxes are called and reported by inspectors as “Sample Tax”.
The law also stipulates the following tax rates for each instance of international 
passenger and cargo transportation.
30 Law on Personal income tax on street vendors and small businesses whose production and services 
can not be categorized for the tax purposes
Types of Work and Service
Tax Rates (in MNT)
Via Zamyn-Uud 
and Altanbulag 
Border Crossing
Other Border 
Crossing
1. For each instance of international passenger transportation:
a) By passenger car up to 4 seats 10 000 6 000
b) By passenger vehicle up to 8 seats 12 000 8 000
c) By vehicle up to 16 seats 14 000 10 000
d) By bus 18 000 12 000
2. For each instance of cargo transportation:
a) By vehicle with 1-3 tonnage 16 000 10 000
b) By vehicle with 3-5 tonnage 18 000 12 000
c) By vehicle with 5-8 tonnage 20 000 14 000
d) By vehicle with tonnage over 8 22 000 16 000
e) By tractor 10 000 4 000
Table 2.4 Tax Rates for International Passenger and Cargo Transportation
Tax Concession and Exemption
There is no provision on concession and exemption in the Law on Personal 
income tax on street vendors and small businesses whose production and 
service can not be categorized for the tax purposes. Therefore, these issues 
shall be regulated by the Law on Personal Income Tax. 
Tax Distribution and Reporting
Individuals engaged in such businesses shall register with the local tax authorities 
and make the tax payment in cash or bank transfer. The payers of the “sample 
tax” as established by the Finance Minister shall pay each month MNT 10,000 in 
Ulaanbaatar; MNT 8,000 in Nalaikh, Baganuur, and central soums and permanent 
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border crossing points of Darkhan-Uul and Orkhon aimags; and MNT 4,000 in all 
other administrative units, as an advance payment and shall register and obtain 
a certificate as a taxpayer. The taxpayers shall report quarterly by the 15th of the 
first month of the next quarter and annually by 10 February the following year to 
the local tax authorities. Their taxable income shall be calculated in accordance 
with the methodology established by the respective Minister.
The tax payment and reporting are regulated as above. However, in practice 
individuals fail to file the tax return or do not have the ability to file it or their 
businesses tend to be temporary. Therefore, many difficulties exist. The tax 
distribution, nevertheless, is not complicated due to the direct appropriation of 
related revenues into the soum (district) budget income account.
Research into the above taxation authority reveals that the so called local tax 
types contributing to the local budget are all established by the central government 
authorities. In other words, there is no single tax that would possess all attributes31 
of a truly local tax. Especially, the types, rates, and concession and exemption 
authority for aimag-level taxes are centralized by the central government. Some 
of the soum taxes (for example, usage fees for plants, water, mineral water, 
and common minerals) are established by the aimag CRH in accordance with 
the law. This means that the soum taxation authority is overtaken by the upper 
instance and its authority is limited.
The local governments exercise their authority to levy and collect respective 
taxes and most of the proceeds directly go into their local budget. Only mineral 
royalty and exploitation and exploration license fees are centrally appropriated 
and then re-distributed by the central government. In other words, local taxes only 
have such attributes of classical local taxes as authority to levy and collect.
Some types of taxes such as permit fees (C5) for usage of natural resources 
other than minerals, municipal taxes, a dog ownership charge, inheritance and 
gift taxes are not regulated by legal acts at present. In other words, the authority 
for these taxes is not yet established. Some inconsistency is also observed in 
terms of legal provisions. For example, the Law on Central Budget stipulates 
for the usage fee for hunting stock and the license fee for animal hunting and 
catching as the two sources of soum budget revenues. However, the Law on 
Hunting Stock Usage Fee designates the hunting fee as the central budget 
source and the license fee as the local budget source.
31 (i) levied by local government; (ii) rates established by local authorities; (iii) collected by local 
authorities; (iv) the revenues proceeded to local budget
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2.3 AUTHORITY OF NON-TAX REVENUE
This chapter looks at the definition of each particular type of non-tax revenue, 
which is stated in the Law about Consolidated budget of Mongolia, and legislation 
related to non-tax revenue and scope of their regulation. 
Local non-tax revenue shall consist of the following revenues32: 
1. Income from dividends from business enterprises with local ownership 
2. Payment for use of local property, income from interests and penalties 
3. Financing for output commissioned by the portfolio minister from state 
budget funds 
4. Other revenue to be collected for aimag or capital city budget according 
to law 
Although the law states in general these four types of revenues, in the tax return 
for Tax authority the following types of revenues should be shown in more 
detail: 
1. Income from dividends from business enterprise with local ownership 
2. Revenue from interests and penalties 
3. Own income of State budget organizations
4. Revenue from rent and tenancy 
5. Revenue from sale of property 
6. Revenue from privatization
7. Other unclassified revenue
Therefore, related authority, legislation, its legal scope of each of these detailed 
revenues are studied in this chapter. 
According to data from the local Tax authority, a number of problems such as 
contradiction between and misplacement of different types of non-tax revenues 
is observed. For example: Revenue from rent was classified in as “Rent revenue” 
in Umnugovi aimag, but in Khentii aimag it was stated in “Other unclassified 
revenue” for the financial statement. 
Dividends from business enterprises with local ownership 
If there is local property in the share capital of any business enterprise, the local 
autority has a right to receive dividends. However, a decision  on the issuance 
of dividends and its amount per share is made by the majority of shareholders 
of that entity. In other words, shareholders decide whether dividends shall be 
32 10.2 of Law on State unified budget
Rational allocation of local budget revenues42
issued. Whether local authorities receive dividends also depends on the decision 
of common shareholders and shareholders with preferential rights. 
Of selected aimags, Unmugovi aimag holds 51% of shares in the Tsogttsegtsii 
coal mining company and has been receiving dividends every year. It received 
6.0 million tugrugs worth of dividends in 2008. The Bayan-Ulgii aimag power 
station is partly locally owned, but it has not issued any dividends yet. 
Revenue from interests and penalties
Interests and fines are the penalty from state autority for people, who violated 
law in local territories. 
Income from interests and penalties comes in large part from three subjects: 
the Tax authority, the State professional inspection organization, and the Police 
department. 
These organizations impose interests and fines according to the following laws: 
À.  Tax administration
• Taxation law of Mongolia
• Law on Administrative penalty of Mongolia
B.  State Professional Inspection
• Law on State inspection
• Law on Administrative penalty of Mongolia
• Labour law of Mongolia  
C.  Police
• Law on Administrative penalty of Mongolia
• Law on traffic of Mongolia
The amount of interest and fines is planned by the local authorities on the 
basis of an average income from fines, but related employees are not forced to 
accomplish this amount as a target nor it is viewed as a performance indicator.
In approximate estimation33, most of the revenue from interests and fines 
is collected by the local Tax authority and the State professional inspection 
organization and the rest of revenue is provided by the Police department.
Own income of State budget organizations
According to the Public management and financing law, local govnernment 
units have  aright to earn income from additional activities besides their main 
33 Local tax administration do not book by organization, so the clear amount can not be estimated. 
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operations, so some local organizations provide some kinds of services to 
generate income. 
State organizations make earn income from additional activities such as carrying 
out detailed research and data on commission, sales of publications, copying 
materials, sales of food products from their farms. The prices and types of 
recompenced services should be defined by by-laws of these organization. 
On the other hand, asking for compensation for provision of services is improper, 
because the  basic obligation of public organizations is to provide services to 
people. If state organizations are required to collect pre-planned high amounts 
of revenue, there is a danger of them following an improper principle of charging 
their services to population. In every aimag public organizations have their own 
revenue, but they differ in different aimags.
Revenue from rent and tenancy 
If it is not against their interests, local organizations have the right to allow 
someone to temporarily use its property in order to generate income. The 
tenancy should be based on the decision of Citizen’s Representatives’ Khural of 
the territorial and administrative unit. The most regular type is rent of buildings 
and other structures. 
The amount, terms of payment and other general regulations related to rent 
are determined in the frame of general regulations developed by the Citizen’s 
Representatives’ Khural, and specified by the Rent agreement between the local 
autority and the renter. 
While certain income from rent was received in Govi-Altai, Tuv, and Dornogovi 
aimags, other aimags did not have this type of income. 
Income from sale of property 
This is imcome from sale of local property based on the decision of the Citizen’s 
Representatives’ Khural. Sale of property includes sale of movable and immovable 
properties, equipment etc. 
In reality, there is almost no sale of property at local level in Mongolia and 
according to the Ministry of Finance report on budget income performance 
in 2006 to 2008, a few cases of sale of local property took place in Bulgan, 
Dornogovi, Umnugovi, Govi-Altai, Orkhon aimags.
Income from privatization 
During the transition to the market economy, privatization of local property took 
place  Mongolia, but in recent years, it was done rarely because privatization has 
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finished in general. 
The Citizen’s Representatives’ Khural decides whether property should be 
privatized and determines the price of property and forms of payment, then the 
local privatization comission implements the process. 
According to the Ministry of Finance report on budget income performance, 
some privatization took place in Tuv, Dornogovi, Govi-Altai aimags in the last 
three years. 
Other unclassified revenue
There are no regulations that describe what kind of revenues should be included 
in this group, so every aimag reports according to their standard practice. Local 
tax inspectors explain that revenue received once as a result of  certain activity 
are usually included in this classification. 
Income from rent, own income of State budget organizations, interests and fines 
issued by the fire brigade were classified as a “other unclassified revenue” in the 
reports from local tax authorities. 
If non-tax income is examined in general, local governments have three types of 
non-tax revenue that are within their power: revenue from privatization, sale of 
property and rent.  Income from privatization and sale of property is very limited 
and as at present privatization and sale of local property have been finished, this 
type of revenue will not be there in the future. 
Rates of interests and fines are defined by the parliament, so local governments 
have no right to redefine or lessen the rate. 
Dividends from business entities with local ownership could present an opportunity 
to increase the local budget revenue. However, there is a danger that the local 
administration might engage in business activities using their advantage over 
other private businesses, so that the market system can be disturbed. Therefore, 
owning a share in such local business entity as a power station, which is difficult 
for private businesses to run on their own  would be more effective.  
Own income of state organizations is usually quite small  and local authorities do 
not decide what the amount of revenue should be. 
As a conclusion, revenues from privatization and property sale are disappearing 
and local authorities have no right to take part in process of defining authority of 
non-tax revenue types other than  the rent revenue. 
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3. ANALYSIS OF LOCAL BUDGET REVENUE
The state budget revenue has been increasing for the last  few years, while 
the percentage of local budget revenue in the total budget and GDP has been 
continuously decreasing.   The percentage of local budget revenue in the total 
income and expenditure as well as the percentage of local budget revenue in 
the GDP are main indicators of centralization or decentralization in any country. 
(See Table 3.1 and Graph 3.1.) 
While the percentage of total budget revenue in the GDP increased from 33.4 
percent in 2000 to 43.7 percent in 2008, the percentage of local revenuein the 
GDP decreased from 6.5 percent in 2000 to 2.8 percent in 2008. The percentage 
of the local revenue in the total revenue has had a similar dynamics of change 
decreasing from 19.2 percent in 2000 to 6.4 percent in 2008.
Indicator 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue/GDP 33.4 37.2 37.9 36.8 36.3 36.7 34.5 39.4 43.7
Local revenue/GDP 6.5 7.6 8.4 3.2 3.1 3.1 2.3 2.8 2.8
Local revenue/total 
revenue
19.2 20 21.6 8.6 8.4 8.5 6.4 6.9 6.4
Local expenditure/
local revenue
196.8 183.4 161.1 105.4 115.4 111.8 109.4 106.7 127.7
Table  3.1  Percentage of the local revenues in the GDP and total 
expenditure, 2000-2008
Source: Calculations are  based on the data from the draft budget for 2008.
Moreover,  a fact that the ratio between the local expenditure and local revenue 
decreased from 196.8 percent in 2000 to 127.7 percent in 2008 is related to 
transfer of basic social service issues such as education, health, culture and 
social welfare from local competence to the respective ministries under the Law 
on Management and Financing of State Budget Organizations (LMFSBO). In 
general, implementation of the LMFSBO caused reduction of local responsibilities 
and expansion of the size, power and budget of the central government, its 
ministries and agencies thus leading back to centralization. 
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Graph 3.1 State and local budget revenue’s percentage in the GDP
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Transfer of financing of health and education services to the central government 
had certain positive effects such as timely financing of the services, absence of 
budget losses during the last years and improvement of the budget expenditure 
discipline, which cannot be denied. These positive  outcomes  were a result 
of establishment of uniform standards for service expenditures, establishment 
of the unified system of the state fund and improvement of supervision of 
expenditures.   However, as the life shows they  should not  free local authorities 
from  responsibilities related to provision of the above services  to the electors 
and the solution  can not be reached by centralization of powers. 
According to researchers  weakening of responsibility and initiative of local 
governments  with regard to these services, impossibilty to make financing 
flexibly in accordance with the local conditions,  over-supervision of expense 
administration resulted in a number of negative economic, financial, administrative 
and political consequences such as weakening of initiatives to save expenses 
,impossibility to make a shift between different items of expenditure , weakening 
of the unity of the governance of an administrative unit, contraction of its role 
in the country’s development, inability to solve any issues related to these 
services promptly at the local level, and weakening of the political accountability 
of the local governments . Many research reports, presentations and dicussions 
demonstrate such consequences.
Table 3.2 demonstrates indicators of centralization vs decentralization in foreign 
countries, including member states of the Organization of Economic Cooperation 
and Development.  The average indicator of local budget expenditure in the GDP 
is 10-15 percent and the percentage of the local budget expenditure in the budget 
expenditure is 20-25. 
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Source: Anwar Shah, Local governance in industrial countries
Table 3.2  Percentage of the local budget expenditure in the GDP and in 
the budget expenditure
Country Percentage of the local 
budget expenditure in 
the GDP
Percentage of the local 
budget expenditure in 
the budget expenditure
Scandinavian countries 16-30 35-50
USA and UK 8-10 20-22
Germany, France and 
Canada
6-7 15-18
New Zealand, Mongolia 3 8
The total local budget revenue has increased by 14.5 bln tugrugs  in the past 
5 years with the highest increase of 44.4 bln tugrugs in 2007, which is directly 
related to tax revenues, including income from minerals royalties.34 
34 These numbers are calculated in comparison with 2008 data. Note: the data in the report are taken 
based on the comparison of the years for these data and the inflation rates of other years. See the 
methodology in Appendix  #5. 
Graph 3.2  Total revenue of the local budget, current revenues, tax revenues 
and non-tax revenues in the budget expenditure
Souce: Data from the report of the Ministry of Finance
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rev.
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Local budget revenue 70.6 85.7 92.3 100.7 145.1 142.9 225
Current revenue 67.1 81.2 88.2 95.7 138.4 138.1 220.9
Tax revenue 45.9 62.8 71.9 79.3 114.2 121.9 203.0
Non-tax revenue 21.2 18.4 16.4 16.5 24.3 16.2 17.9
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The percentage of the tax revenue in the total budget revenue has increased  to 
65.03% - 78.65% of the total local budget revenue  in the last 5 years. Meanwhile, 
the non-tax revenue has been continuously decreasing for the past 5 years from 
29.9% of the total revenue in 2003 to 16.7% in 2007 and to 11.3% according to 
the revised budget for 2008. In other words, the percentage of the tax revenue 
in the total local budget revenue has increased and the percentage of the non-
tax revenue has decreased. But the percentage of the soums and  districts’ tax 
revenue in the tax revenue has increased from 30.4% in 2003 to 40% for the last 
years. In other words, even at the local level the major part of the budget revenue 
is centralized at aimags and their revenue allocation is not even.
Source: Analysis is based on the budget revenue data from the Ministry of 
Finance
Graph 3.3  Weight of aimags, capital city, soums and districts`  tax revenue 
in the total local tax revenue
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The analysis of the current local budget revenue in Mongolia raises  the following 
questions: 
• Are the aimags and soums’ budgets autonomous  in  terms of planning 
and expenditure?
• Is there any permanent local income source or tax basis? 
• Can the tax basis be a permanent income source?
• Are the tax revenues different across regions and administrative units?
• What is the main tax that  forms the local budget revenue?
In order to find answers to these questions, a study was conducted based on data 
from 4 example aimags covering 8 soums, 2 soums from each aimag, taking into 
account their budget revenue differences, centralization, infrastructure, regional 
peculiarity and remoteness, thus avoiding expansive budgetary and financial 
research covering all administrative units in Mongolia. The soums are selected 
as a central one and a remote one. 
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Table 3.3 Aimags and soums covered by the study
Aimag Soum Comment
Khentii
Kherlen Central
Bayankhutag Remote
Bayan-Ulgii
Ulgii Central
Buyant Remote
Umnugobi
Dalanzadgad Central
Khanbogd Remote
Orkhon
Bayan-Undur Central
Jargalant Remote
In order to have an effective and accessible study, it was important to make 
an analysis based on budget statements and data of four aimags of different 
regions including two different soums of each aimag, to personally meet relevant 
authorities, to take records and clarify reasons  of problems.   With regard to the 
survey outcomes it was important to analyse local budget revenue at two basic 
levels of aimags and soums considering each tax revenue.  
3.1 ANALYSIS OF THE AIMAG BUDGET REVENUE
This chapter studies in detail dynamic growth of taxes in aimags and the capital 
in 2003-2008, differences between aimags with respect to growth and  decline 
of certain types of taxes for the respective years and factors that effected such 
situation based on the examples of Bayan-Ulgii, Khentii, Umnugobi and Orkhon 
aimags.
The study determined the percentage of the aimags and capital’s tax revenue in 
local budget revenue in the selected four aimags, its future trends, the income 
base of the given tax, factors affecting it. 
In order to compare tax revenues over years, the real revenue was determined 
by comparing data of the previous years with 2008 using an inflation index.
The structure of the tax revenue for the last three years in the selected aimags 
demonstrates that while the tax revenue derived from minerals constituted 21% 
of the local tax revenue in 2006,  its percentage inreased rapidly up to 49% 
in 2007 and to 60% in 2008. According to Attachment #9, the percentage of 
revenues from related taxes also increased twice every year. The major growth 
of revenue from minerals royalties occured in Orkhon aimag and the growth of 
revenue from license payments occured in Umnugobi and Dornogobi aimags. 
Revenue from minerals related taxes rapidly grew over the last 2 years thus 
increasing local tax revenue.
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Source: Data from the Ministry of Finance for 2006-2008
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Graph 3.4  Weight of aimags’ taxes in the total tax revenues in aimags and 
the capital
However, the percentage of  revenue from  real estate tax, land fee and tax on 
vehicles and other  means of transport in the aimags tax revenue decreased 
every year despite the growth of  taxes every year.   While the major part of the 
real estate tax and land  fees  was collected in Ulaanbaatar and Orkhon aimag, 
the major part of the tax on vehicles and other means of transport  was collected 
in Ulaanbaatar alone. The Erdenet mining corporation is the main contributor to 
the local tax revenue in Orkhon aimag. 
As the above data shows, the major part of  revenue from minerals-related tax 
comes from areas with vast natural resources that are exploited, while the major 
part of revenue from  real estate tax, land  fees and tax on vehicles and other 
means of transport comes from Ulaanbaatar city with the highest concentration 
of population. 
Let us look at the dynamics of growth of  aimag and the capital city tax revenue 
in 2003-2008 by each type of the tax. 
Immovable property tax
The rate of the immovable property tax has not changed since its adoption in 
1997. While  in 2004-2006 real revenue from the real estate tax to the local budget 
was at permanent rate of 8.9 bln tugrugs in average,  it  started to increase a 
little from 2007 – in average by 1 bln tugrugs. However,  while the percentage of 
immovable property tax revenue in the local budget revenue was decreasing by 
1% in 2003-2006,  it started to decrease by 1.5% from 2006 thus  it is likely to 
drop down until 3.5% in 2009.
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As business enterprises do evaluation of their fixed assets once in 5-6 years, 
the tax paid by them during the relevant years remains stable, but the real price 
decreases  every year due to passage of time..  Though in 2003-2007  real 
revenue from the immovable property tax increased by 5-8%, it has a tendency 
to decrease in 2008 and 2009. 
This demonstrates that though the percentage of immovable property tax in local 
budget revenue is decreasing due to  increase of  real revenue of the local budget, 
the real revenue is stable staying at 9 bln tugrugs in average every year.
Graph 3.5  Immovable property tax (comparative prices for 2008, in billion 
tugrugs)
Source: Data from the reports by the Ministry of Finance
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 rev. 2009 pla.
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Source: Data from reports by the Mnistry of Finance
Graph 3.6  Percentage of immovable property tax in local budget revenues, 
2003-2009
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According to the study of  revenue generated by immovable property tax in 
aimags in 2007, its percentage  was 60.4% in Ulaanbaatar, 18.4% in Orkhon 
aimag, 4.7% in Darkhan-Uul aimag and 0.27-3.0% in other aimags., Ulaanbaatar 
city with the highest concentration of population, collects the most. In Orkhon 
aimag, buildings of the Erdenet mining corporation are the main source for the 
immovable property tax revenue.
Rational allocation of local budget revenues52
Immovable property tax revenue is derived from buildings used by organizations 
and individuals for business purposes and land privatized to individuals freely. 
In the selected aimags,  revenue from this type of tax and their percentage in 
local budget revenues vary across the aimags. (See Appendix  #6)
The average amount of revenue from immovable property tax is 20.0 mln tugrugs 
in Bayan-Ulgii aimag, 60.0 mln tugrugs in Khentii aimag, 100.0 mln tugrugs in 
Umnugobi aimag and 1.8 bln tugrugs in Orkhon aimag. As  one of the biggest 
mines in the world – the Erdenet mining corporation – is located in Orhon aimag, 
its revenue is far higher than in other aimags. In Umnugobi aimag, the coal mine 
located in Gurvantes soum generates about 10% of the aimag’s revenue from 
immovable property tax. Also other small mines contribute to the immovable 
property tax revenue to certain extent.
In contrast to other aimags, Bayan-Ulgii aimag does not have big mines. Many 
of its soums do not contribute any revenue from immovable property tax. All 
these circumstances lead to low revenue from immovable property tax. In 
Khentii aimag, soums contribute quite evenly from immovable property tax. 
Delgerkhaan, Tsenhermandal and Binder soums collect 2.0 mln tugrugs from 
immovable property tax and the Berkh village collects 8% of the aimag’s revenue 
from immovable property tax.
Immovable property tax calculations (see Appendix  #9) are  made based on 
revenue estimations from immovable property tax to be collected from land 
owned by individuals and tax from buildings. 
At present when each household owns 0.07 hectares of land, the real estate tax 
of  240 tugrugs paid to the aimag and 40 tugrugs paid to the soums every year 
is too low. It is even more evident if compared  to the 300 tugrugs fare  for public 
transport service.
Source: Data from reports by the Ministry of Finance
Graph 3.7  Immovable property tax revenue (by aimags, 2007)
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Example 1 
... It is meaningless  to spend so much money  in order to receive  such low fees. 
Therefore, it is necessary to increase the amount of fees...         
/Khentii aimag/
Though  land ownership by individuals has increased in aimags, this type of tax 
revenue cannot significantly increase the local budget revenue.
To sum up, most of  revenue from immovable property tax comes from real estate 
tax imposed on buildings, which leads to high tax revenue mostly in the areas with 
mines and  large enterprises. Also, relatively high revenue from immovable property 
tax is derived from aimag centers with higher population concentration. 
The following factors were examined  in order to determine if this type of tax will 
contribute to  sustainable local income  and if  its  volume   will increase.
Although the percentage of the tax and the number of  tax payers  directly affect 
the volume of tax revenue, development of infrastructure and a potential for a 
new large plant or mine to operate in near future in the area are also important 
factors to influence  tax revenue to a certain extent, though not directly.
According to the evaluation of infrastructure development, Orkhon aimag 
was evaluated as “very good” as it has  a paved road and a railway, Khentii 
aimag was evaluated as “good” as it has  a paved road, and Bayan-Ulgii and 
Umnugobi aimags were evaluated as “satisfactory” as they don’t have either 
paved   road or railway. Population is also estimated to grow  with development 
of infrastructure.
It is possible to reduce  concessions granted for immovable property tax imposed 
on the land owned free of charge by individuls and thus to increase the tax rates. 
. In other words, taking into account a fact that more than 10 years have passed 
since adoption of the Immovable Property Tax Law and the currency rate dropped 
to certain extent in that period, it is possible to significantly increase the immovable 
property tax revenue from local land ownership by reducing the percentage of 
concessions  provided by Article 7 of the Immovable Property Tax Law. 
Though the tax payment from buildings may increase following  the increasing 
price of the immovable property, business entities usually do not make  re-
evaluation of their immovable property. It is possible to increase the current rate 
of 0.6%. Therefore, aa conclusion was made that  all aimags”have a possibility” 
to increase evaluation per unit. 
We had interviews with local authorities and citizens to study whether there was 
a potential for establishment of new major enterprises and mines in the given 
area in near future. Umnugobi aimag, where a number of mines are going to 
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start operations and Khentii aimag, where there were rumors of a few new mines 
were assessed as “having a potential” . Bayankhongor  and Orkhon aimags were 
assessed as “unclear”, because there were no major mines or enterprises to be 
built  in these aimags. 
The aimags were evaluated evenly as “good”, because this type of tax is paid 
from immovable property located in their territories thus being a long-term source 
for this type of revenue in these aimags. 
Table 3.4  Evaluation of the factors to influence the immovable property 
tax revenue
¹ Criteria Khentii Bayan-Ulgii Umnugobi Orkhon
1 Potential for increase of the 
tax basis
Good Satisfactory Good Satisfactory
2 Development of 
infrastructure 
Good Satisfactory Satisfactory Very good
3 Potential for increase of the 
tax per unit
Possible Possible Possible Possible
4 Tendency for population 
growth in near future
Good Satisfactory Satisfactory Good
5 Potential for generation of 
long-term stable revenue
Good Good Good Good
6 Potential for major 
enterprises and mines
Possible Unclear Possible Unclear
 Evaluation of the potential 
of  tax revenue growth
Good Bad Good Satisfactory
If we summarize these factors, the potential for growth of  immovable property tax 
revenue is evaluated as “good” in Khentii and Umnugobi aimags, “satisfactory” in 
Orkhon aimag and “bad” in Bayan-Ulgii aimag. Attention should be paid to other 
factors affecting growth of tax revenue such as local administrative capacity, 
their efforts, accountability.
Revenue from immovable property tax constitutes in average 10% in Orkhon 
aimag and in average 1.5-3.0% in other three aimags. Even if  new mines are 
built in these three aimags and immovable property evaluation goes up , their 
revenue from immovable property tax may  reach at the most 10% of the local 
budget revenue. 
Therefore,  aimags with good infrastructure, major mines and enterprises have a 
potential for  growth of revenue from immovable property tax. 
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Vehicle and other  automotives tax
The rate of this type of tax is imposed under the 1997 amendment. However, due 
to the increase of the number of automobiles by 10.0 thousand every years, this 
type of revenue has been increasing every year reaching 7.8 bln tugrugs in 2008, 
which is twice higher compared to 2003. 
Source: Data from reports by the Ministry of Finance
Graph 3.8  Vehicle and other automotive tax (comparative rates by 2008, in 
bln tug)
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Nevertheless, the percentage of this type of tax revenue in local budget revenue 
decreased every year reaching 5.5% in 2008 down from  9.7% in 2003.  This is 
related to  increase of the local budget revenue and the unchanged tax rate.  
Source: Data from reports by the Ministry of Finance
Graph 3.9  Percentage of vehicle and other automotive tax in local budget 
revenue (2007) 
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60% of this type of revenue is collected in Ulaanbaatar. In other aimags the 
percentage is comparable  – approximately 1.2-3.4%. 
Source: Data from reports by the Ministry of Finance
Graph 3.10  Revenue from vehicle and other automotives tax in aimags 
(2007)
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This type of tax is imposed on all types of automobiles owned by individuals 
based on the capacity of their engines. No concession  is granted on this type 
of tax. 
The table in appendix 6 demonstrates  main indicators of the tax in the selected 
four aimags. 
Orkhon and Umnugobi aimags have a relatively high volume  of this type of tax 
revenue – in average 250.0 mln tug each. Khentii and Bayan-Ulgii aimags collect 
in average 140.0 mln tugrugs each. The volume of tax revenue in Umnugobi 
aimag  rose sharply up to 70.0 mln tugrugs in 2007 and 140.0 mln tugrugs in 
2008. In other aimags the growth is low remaining at 10.0-30.0 mln tugrugs. In 
some aimags the volume  has even decreased.
Examination of vehicles of major organizations in soums and other rural areas is 
conducted by representatives of aimag authorities.. The vehicles are recorded 
in the column “division” of the tax office records. While in 2007  revenue from 
the tax on vehicles was 110.0 mln tugrugs , it increased twice in 2008 reaching 
220.0 mln tugrugs. This demonstrates that the major part of tax revenue growth 
is generated from new mining companies established in rural areas. Also, the 
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increased volume of tax payment per  household  is caused by popularity  of 
Landcruisers among Umnugobi residents. 
The average percentage of the vehicle tax in local tax revenue is 1.2% in Orkhon, 
3.0% in Umnugobi, 6% in Khentii and 13% in Bayan-Ulgii. The percentage of this 
type of tax is low in areas with a well-developed mining sector and is high in 
areas with a low-developed mining sector. 
For each aimag, the percentage of the tax in local budget revenue has a tendency 
for further decrease.
Development of roads, the population size  and newly established mines may 
have a direct positive effect on the base of this type of tax.
While  five years have passed since  paved roads were built in Orkhon aimag, 
only one year ago  such roads were built in Khentii aimag. Therefore, it was 
assumed that purchase of automobiles will increase in the aimag in the future. 
Table 3.5  Evaluation of the growth of the tax base on automobiles and 
other  means of transport
¹ Criteria Khentii
Bayan-
Ulgii
Umnugobi Orkhon
1 Development of 
infrastructure
Good
Satisfac-
tory
Satisfac-
tory
Very good
2 Potential for growth of the 
tax volume  per unit
Possible Possible Possible Possible
3 Tendency for increase of 
population concentration in 
near future
Good
Satisfac-
tory
Satisfac-
tory
Good
4 Potential for generation of 
long-term stable revenue Good Good Good Good
 Evaluation of the potential 
of growth of  tax revenue Good
Satisfac-
tory
Satisfac-
tory
Good
The vehicle tax has been imposed according to the rate adopted in 1997. If 
we take into account a fact that over 10 years have passed since then and the 
currency rate has dropped 1.8 times since 2001, then the local budget revenue 
may be augmented  to certain extent by increasing  the tax rate per unit. 
If the tax rate was increased twice, it would constitute 8-15% in the local budget 
revenues of Khentii and Bayan-Ulgii aimags thus increasing the local budgets 
significantly,  while in Orkhon and Umnugobi aimags it would bring a little growth 
compared to  local budgets . 
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The example of Umnugobi aimag demonstrates that operation of newly established 
mining companies has high impact on growth of income from the vehicle tax. 
Therefore, the evaluation gave high importance to the potential of the aimags to 
build new major mines. As it is obvious that the  number of vehicles will increase 
along with the total economic growth, it is not included in the evaluation.
To summarise the factors described above, the potential for  growth of the 
vehicles tax base in Khentii and Umnugobi aimags is evaluated was “good”, 
“satisfactory” in Orkhon aimag and “bad” in Bayan-Ulgii aimag. 
In other words,  while there is a possibility to increase the local budget revenue 
by increasing  the tax rate,  tax revenue in Umnugobi and Khentii aimags with 
high development of the mining sector or with a potential for such development 
may also increase  with  abrupt  growth of the number of vehicles.
Minerals royalty
While in 2006 minerals royalty was 7.4 bln tugrugs in 2006, it reached 25.4 bln 
tugrugs in 2007, increasing 3 times and it is likely to reach 40.7 bln tugrugs in 
2008, increasing almost twice compared to the previous year. In other words, the 
minerals royalty has been increasing 2-3 times  every year. 
Source: Data from reports by the Ministry of Finance
Graph 3.11  Mineral royalty, 2003-2007 (comparative rates by 2008, in bln tug)
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The percentage of this type of tax in local budget revenue increased up to 21.6% 
in 2007 and 28.5% in 2008, while before 2006 it used to be 4% in average. This 
demonstrates that the volume of minerals royalty and its percentage in total local 
budget revenue increased at the same time  and has become one of the main 
contributors to  tax revenue in the local budgets.  
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Source: Data from reports by the Ministry of Finance
Graph 3.12  Percentage of minerals royalty in local budget revenue, 
2003-2007
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Orkhon aimag alone contributed 60% or 14.8 bln tugrugs to this type of tax 
revenue. Selenge aimag contributed 10%, Umnugobi aimag’s - 6.4%, Sukhbaatar 
and Central aimags - 5.5% each, Bayankhongor aimag - 3%, and Uvurkhangai 
aimag - 4%. Other 15 aimags contribute 0.1-1% each thus having very low 
percentage in the total revenue. The minerals royalty revenue is higher in aimags 
with a developed mining sector.    
Graph 3.13 Minerals royalty, 2007 data by aimags
Source: Data from reports by the Ministry of Finance
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Royalty for usage of  mineral resources such as gold, copper, coal and fluorspar 
is a tax paid to the national and local budgets.
While payment and settlement of royalties for gold and copper are  made to the 
state budget for subsequent transfer of respective amounts to the local budgets, 
royalties for coal and spar are collected by local tax offices for subsequent 
transfer to the state budget. 
While the minerals royalty  accounts for 2-3% in the Bayan-Ulgii aimag’s budget, 
it  accounts for 60% in Orkhon aimag and 20% in Khentii and Umnugobi aimags 
each.  As Bayan-Ulgii aimag does not have an operating major mine (they receive 
coal they need from Uvs aimag), income from  minerals royalty is low there. Khentii 
aimag collects the royalty from the Bor-Undur fluorspar mine and the Chandaga 
coal mine. Umnugobi aimag collects the major part of it  from Tavantolgoi and 
Suhait coal mines. Orkhon aimag receives most of the revenue from this type of 
tax from sale of  copper mined at the Erdenet mining company. 
Minerals royalty is a major source of tax revenue in the budgets of  areas with a 
developed mining sector.  However, the study shows that the local authorities are 
interested in increasing their share from this type of tax and do not pay enough 
attention to revenue from other types of tax. 
We  studied a potential for establishment of new mines in near future, existence 
of a market for purchase of extracted minerals and a potential for growth of the 
price of raw materials as factors having an important influence. 
¹ Criteria Khentii
Bayan-
Ulgii
Umnugobi Orkhon
1 Potential for new mines
Good
Satis-
factory
Good Bad
2 Raw materials price growth trends Satis-
factory
 
Satisfac-
tory
Satisfac-
tory
3 Market for purchase of minerals Satis-
factory
 
Satisfac-
tory
Good
 Evaluation of the potential  of the 
tax revenue growth
Satis-
factory
Satis-
factory
Satisfac-
tory
Satisfac-
tory
Table 3.6 Evaluation of  growth of the minerals royalty base
The potential of Khentii aimag is assessed as “good”, because there are plans 
to establish new coal and  Fluorspar mines. That of Umnugobi aimag is also 
assessed as “good”, because the Energy Resources company and several 
mines such as the Khurmen coal mines are prepared to start  mining activities 
there. The potential of Bayan-Ulgii aimag is assessed as “satisfactory”, because 
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at present there is no mine to be possibly mined  there except for the Asgat silver 
deposit. Orkhon aimag does not have any new mines to exploit at present. 
As the coal mined in Umnugobi aimag is always exported to China, the codition 
of its market,where the commodity prices might  drop  (the Chinese are likely 
to take steps in order to drag down the price among numerous Mongolian coal 
companies) is assessed as “satisfactory”. As copper is sold at  the global  market, 
the market situation is assessed as “good”. 
As prices for raw materials  are currently low at  the world market, but are going 
to grow in a certain time period according to estimates of the  global community, 
the market situation is assessed as “satisfactory”. (It is impossible to guess, when 
the prices will start to grow.) An issue of possible exploitation  of the Oyutolgoi 
deposit located in Umnugobi aimag is not included in the evaluation. 
Minerals royalty is a type of revenue, which highly depends on the price of raw 
materials at the world market rather than on  local administrative activities. Therefore, 
it is difficult for local authorities to control and plan this type of revenue. 
Based on the above situation, it was concluded that if the  copper price at the 
global market does not start to rise,  revenue of Orkhon aimag will reduce 
significantly and the minerals royalty based revenues in other three aimags will 
not grow, but will drop a little.
Land fee
Land fee is derived from the land used and possessed for any purposes by 
individuals and business entities from the local area. 
Though the land fee has increased by 5% in average every year, its revenue to 
the local budget has decresed by 2% in average every year.
Source: Data from reports by the Ministry of Finance
Graph 3.14  Land fee revenue, 2003-2009 (comparative rates by 2008, in bln 
tug)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 rev 2009 pla.
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Of total  land fee 56% is collected in Ulaanbaatar, 32% in Orkhon aimag and 
the remaining 12 % in other 20 aimags. Ulaanbaatar city with high population 
concentration contributes the major part of  revenue. The amount of revenue 
depends on population concentration, so the large number of land owners and 
relatively high land prices in the capital city is the reason for it collecting the 
largest part of land fee revenue.
Graph 3.15  Percentage of land fee in the local budget revenue, 
2003-2007
Source: Data from reports by the Ministry of Finance
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 rev. 2009 pla.
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A comparison of the land fees and their percentage in the local budget revenues is 
made in the selected 4 aimags as demonstrated in Appendix  #6. 
In Orkhon aimag, land registration and land fee collection are carried out by 
the Land Office, while in Khentii, Bayan-Ulgii and Umnugobi aimags, land fee 
collection is  implemented by Tax Divisions. 
Graph 3.16. Land fees in 2007, by aimags
Source: Data from reports by the Ministry of Finance
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According to Graph 3.16, in Orkhon aimag, land fees account for 25% of the 
local budget revenue , while in other aimags the land fees make up  1.5-7%. Of 
total land fee revenue in Orkhon aimag 15.0 mln tugrugs is paid by individuals, 
73.0 mln tugrugs – by Erdmin and Shim technology enterprises, 5.0 mln tugrugs 
– by business entities and individuals engaged in agriculture, and the rest – by 
the Erdenet mining corporation.  
As for Umnugobi aimag, Khanbogd soum collects 75% of the land fees amounting 
to 250.0 mln tugrugs and the  major part of remaining fee is collected from the 
mines located in other soums. Though percentage of the land fees in the budget 
revenue of Umnugobi aimag is lower than that in Bayan-Ulgii aimag, the amount 
collected is five times more than in  Bayan-Ulgii. 
In Bayan-Ulgii aimag, the main part or 60% of  total land fees is collected by 
the aimag center and the rest is paid by the soums engaged in crop cultivation 
activities.  In Khentii aimag, the aimag center collects 11% and the rest is paid 
by Dadal, Gurvanbayan and Batnorov soums, where mining activities are 
conducted.  
While  in Khentii and Bayan-Ulgii aimags the volume of land fees increased by 
10.0 mln tugrugs in average every year (according to the respective year), it 
rapidly increased in Umnugobi aimag by 50.0-80.0 mln tugrugs in average and in 
Orkhon aimag by 100.0-200.0 mln tugrugs in average. Land fees from land used 
for mining purposes contibute greatly to  local budget revenues. 
Such factors as tendency of individuals and enterprises to possess and utilize 
new areas of land and a potential for establishement of new mines were taken 
into account  along with  evaluation of the tax base per unit.
Table 3.7 Evaluation of  the land fee base growth 
¹ Criteria Khentii
Bayan-
Ulgii
Umnugobi Orkhon
1 Potential for granting  new 
areas of land
Good Good Good Bad
2 Possibility to change 
the percentage of tax 
concession 
Possible Possible Possible Possible
3 Tendency for increase of 
population size in near 
future
Good
Satisfac-
tory
Satisfac-
tory
Good
4 Tendency for establishment 
of major enterprises and 
mines
Possible Unclear Possible Unclear
 Evaluation of the potential 
of tax revenue growth Good
Satisfac-
tory
Good
Satisfac-
tory
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Example 2 
... The land capacity is  low in Orkhon aimag. It is possible to expand the area 
by giving Erdenet the status of a city through an amendment in the Law on 
Administrative and Territorial Management...  
/Orkhon aimag/
Orkhon aimag has a smaller territory  compared to other aimags. Therefore, it is 
difficult to grant new plots of land there. In other aimags, avalability of land plots 
is better , therefore they were assessed as “good”. 
As land fee calculations show, in rural areas 97%-98% of  land fees are exempted 
from tax, so at present  revenue  is “too low”. Therefore, it is possible to increase 
revenue by reducing the amount of concessions  except for Orkhon aimag. In 
other words, even  if the size of  croplands  is  expanded, the percentage of land 
fees in the local budget revenue is unlikely to increase significantly. (See land 
fee calculations from Appendix  #9.) It is possible to significanty increase the 
amount of  land fee revenue in the local budget by reducing tax concessions and 
changing the 1997 procedures for land evaluation and tax exemption.  
Example 3 
... Some provisions of the Land Law have not been  implemented yet. Article 7 of 
the Land Law provides for collection of land fees from engineering lines. But this 
provision is not observed in our aimag...  
 /Khentii aimag/
A number of mines  is planned to be opened in Umnugobi aimag and 1-2 mines 
are  going to be opened in Khentii aimag. Therefore, these aimags are assessed 
as having a potential for establishment of new major mines and enterprises. 
As revenue from land fees increases depending on  capacity and size of the 
mine, over 250.0 mln tugrugs per year may be collected from such big mines as 
Oyutolgoi. Currently, there are no plans  about establishment of such big mines. 
According to the example of Umnugobi aimag, one new mine may add 50.0-60.0 
mln tugrugs in average to the budget. Also,  there is a possibility to augment land 
fee revenue  by the way of implementing those legal provisions, which  are not 
observed at present. 
Based on these factors, it is concluded that Khentii and Umnugobi aimags have 
“good” potential for increase of  land fee revenues in near future, while that of 
Bayan-Ulgii and Orkhon aimags  is assessed  as “satisfactory”. 
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Minerals license fee
Real revenue from minerals license fees has increased twice, and so has its 
percentage in the local budget. Minerals license fee (hereinafter referred to 
as license fee) is one of the main taxes contributing to the growth of the local 
budget. 
The main part of this type of revenue is paid by Umnugobi and Dornogobi aimags – 
with 22.8% and 13.4% respectively. Other 12 aimags, where exploration licenses 
are granted extensively (e.g. Khentii, Bulgan and Uvurkhangai) contribute 3%-
6% each in average. 
Graph 3.17  Minerals license fee revenue (comparative rates by 2008, 
in bln tug)
Source: Data from reports by the Ministry of Finance
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Graph 3.18  Percentage of minerals license fee in local budget revenue, 2007
Source: Data from reports by the Ministry of Finance
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 rev. 2009 pla.
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Darkhan and Orkhon aimags as well as Ulaanbaatar city with high concentration 
of population and relatively small areas  almost do not have such type of revenue. 
Aimags without exploration areas or with fully explored land generate very little 
of this type of revenue or  have hardly any of such revenue. 
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Source: Data from reports by the Ministry of Finance
Graph 3.19  Payment of minerals license fees in 2007 (by aimags)
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According to the 2007 Minerals Law, 25% of  revenue from minerals exploration 
and mining licenses are allocated to the aimags and soums. 
The amount of license fees in the selected aimags  is compared in Appendix 
#6. 
License fees constitute 10%-20% of the budget revenues of aimags.   As Orkhon 
aimag has a very small area compared to other aimags and its resources 
under ground are fully identified, it collects little revenue from license fees. The 
percentage of license fee in the local budget revenue is very low in Orkhon 
aimag, while  it is higher in other aimags. 
This type of tax is collected by the central government agency in charge of 
Minerals and then transferred to the Ministry of Finance for subsequent allocation 
to aimag budgets. Therefore, as can be seen from the research, local authorities 
are not able to forecast its payment and regulate it.
Example 4
... According to the 2008 data, there are more than 540 business entities holding 
licenses in our aimag. But we only received 2.4 bln tugrugs for the aimag’s budget 
as license fee payment. It is not clear which business entities paid such fees for 
which areas. When we ask for details of the allocated funds, they are not sent 
to us. Therefore, we are not able to  meet license holders and demand fees from 
them...
... 5.0 bln tugrugs were planned to be received from license fees according to 
the 2008 plan,but we received only 2.4 bln tugrugs. It is not clear who will 
be responsible for the failed plan. It would be unreasonable to blame the local 
authorities. The problem is that  responsibility for  failed works due to  lack of 
funds is imposed on the local authorities. This is abnormal...   
/Umnugobi aimag/
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According to the government procedure on regulation of license fees, 25% of 
the payment from license fees to the aimags must be transferred to the soums. 
However, in Bayan-Ulgii and Umnugobi aimags they are not transferred to the 
soums, but disposed by the aimags. The aimags explained that as it was unclear, 
which business entities paid the fees, it was impossible to transfer the funds to 
the soums. 
Example 5
...Suddenly one day  people come and start drilling and digging in the soum 
area. When we ask them, they show us their exploration licenses. But we know 
nothing about the licenses, the areas they granted for exploration and the license 
holders. When we complain to the Minerals Authority, they answer “We don’t 
have to ask you where to hold exploration”. Coordination among our government 
organizations is really bad...
...Article 19.3 of the Minerals Law requires for permission for exploration from 
local authorities and sets the limit of 30 days for response. If the local authotities 
do not respond in 30 days, the permission is deemed given. In many cases licenses 
are issued without obtaining our permission. Sometimes we receive such requests 
1 day before the deadline. Sometimes they send us only numbers and coordinates 
of the area. We do not have special equipment such as GPS in order to check the 
coordinates... 
/Umnugobi aimag, Khanbogd soum/
When we met with soums authorities in Bayan-Ulgii and Umnugobi aimags and 
asked why they had not received funds from license fees, they replied they did 
not know that the funds should have been transferred to the soums.  Therefore, 
according to the study, it is necessary to ensure full control of  payment of 
license fees by strengthening capacityof  soum authorities, improving technical 
equipment and improving coordination between government organs and to 
improve the minerals law.  
As issuance of licenses, collection of the fees and control of the payment is 
implemented by the Minerals Authority, local authorities have no competence 
to plan and supervise payment of the fees. Therefore, local authorities cannot 
forecast the growth and future amount of this type of tax revenue.
3.2 ANALYSIS OF SOUM BUDGET REVENUE
Total tax revenue in local areas (including soums) consists of revenues from few 
types of taxes. For example, though the law specifies 12 types of tax revenues, 
about 90% of the total tax revenues is derived from only personal income tax, 
stamp duty, minerals royalties and minerals license fee. 
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But as to these four types of taxes, the weight of the personal income tax and 
stamp duty is decreasing, while the weight of minerals royalties and license fee 
is increasing. 
Personal income tax (Ñ1)
Personal income tax accounted for  16% in 2005, 18.58% in 2006 and 10.12% 
in 2007 in total local budget revenue. In these years the tax on salary and other 
similar income, the main generator of the tax revenue, was paid to the centralized 
state budget. According to the revised General Law on Taxation, since 2009 the 
tax  is to be paid to the local budget.  However, as this payment is made  to the 
aimag budget, it does not add to the soum budget.
Graph 3.20  Weight of soum tax revenue in total tax revenue
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2006 2007 2008 revised
Personal income tax 0% 0% 1.3%
Firearm tax 0.5% 0.5% 0.4%
State Stamp Duty 8.7% 5.9% 3.8%
Minerals exploration and mining licence 
fee 0.5% 1.2% 0%
Usage fee on hunting stock, permit fee 
for hunting of catching wild animals 1.9% 0.8% 0.3%
Fee for usage forest wood for fuel 
pursope 3.9% 3.0% 1.4%
Minerals royalty 24.2% 51.9% 53.3%
Lisence fee for usage of natural 
recources other than minerals 0% 0% 20.2%
Water and mineral water usage fee 14.5% 12.2% 8.3%
Popular minerals royalty 0.5% 0.3% 0.1%
Fee for usage of natural plants  45.3% 24.3% 10.9%
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According to the graph above,  personal income tax revenue in the soums located 
at aimag senters or close to aimag centers (according to the performance data 
for 2007, the revenue in Kherlen soum is 25.8 mln tug, Ulgii soum – 19.1 mln 
tug and Dalanzadgad soum – 22.8 mln tug) is relatively high.  The tax directly 
depends on such factors as  population size, unemployment and development 
of small and medium enterprises. Bayankhutag soum of Khentii aimag is located 
about 30 km far from the aimag center, has  small population,  underdeveloped 
infrastructure and weak economy. Its total budget revenue was 70.8 mln tug in 
2007. The personal income tax generated 24% of the total budget revenue in 
that soum, while the percentage was 11% in Kherlen soum, the aimag center 
soum of Khentii aimag. In 2008 the percentage was 16% in Dalanzadgad soum, 
the central soum of Umnugobi aimag, and only 4% in Khanbogd soum, a remote 
soum of the same aimag. In other words, the personal income tax revenue 
is higher in  soums with  larger population and better infrastructure than 
in  isolated soums with  small population. The personal income tax is one 
of the main sources of the soum’s budget revenue in  soums with undeveloped 
infrastructure and scarce minerals resources. Meanwhile, in  soums with  greater 
mining business opportunity, with ongoing exploration works and a relatively 
good infrastructure, the personal income tax is not able to become the main 
source of  soum’s budget revenue. 
Graph 3.21 Personal income tax (comparative data for 2008, in billion 
tugrugs)
Source: Budget data from the Ministry of Finance
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Personal income tax 7.7 12.7 14.8 18.7 14.7 8.3 98.8
Wages, salaries, remuneration, bonus, and 
similar employment income 0 0 0 0 0 0 89.8
Personal income tax on street vendors and 
small businesses 2.5 3.7 3.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.8
Tax on individuals’ income from private 
businesses 2.1 2.8 2.6 2.7 5.1 2.7 3.1
Tax from citizens whit livestock 2.9 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.3 2.6 2.7
Tax on individuals property income and tax 
on sale of property 0.3 3.5 5.4 10.0 3.5 0.0 0.5
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Tax on salary and other similar types of income, which constitute the main part 
of the personal income, started to be paid to budgets of aimags and the capital 
city in 2009. The tax used to be paid to the state budget before. Other types of 
income tax such as the income tax from citizens with livestock, tax on individuals’ 
income from private businesses with the income impossible to determine timely, 
tax on individuals’ property income and tax on sale of property are paid to the 
budgets of soums and districts.  For example, while Kherlen soum of Khentii 
aimag (the central soum with population of 17,494 people) paid 329.9 mln tug to 
the state budget, Bayakhutag soum in the same aimag (a remote soum with a 
population of 2280 people) paid 7.3 ml tug to the state budget in 2007. If the tax on 
salary and other similar types of income is paid to the soum budget, then  remote 
soums can have more sources of such tax. As to the central soums with larger 
population and a relatively high rate of employment, it should be more effective 
to pay the tax on salary and other similar types of income to the aimag budget for 
re-allocation. For example, 550.8 mln tugrugs revenue  accounted for this type of 
tax in Bayan-Undur soum (with a population of 85,121 people) of Orkhon aimag. 
In total, 5.7 bln tugrus is paid in the soum as the tax on salary and other similar 
types of income. In other words, sufficient revenue for further financing of the 
aimag’s total expenditure can be generated from this type of tax. 
Though in soums personal income tax payments, in high or low rates, constitute 
a stable source for budget revenue, in current situation, opportunities to increase 
this source are limited.  For example, such factors as high concentration of 
population in central soums, low development of infrastructure in remote soums 
and payment of tax on salary and other similar types of income to the aimags’ 
Source: Data from budget statements for the last two years in the respective 
soums
Graph 3.22  Personal income tax in the soums covered by the study 
(mln tug)
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budget limit opportunities to increase the tax bases. Though it is possible to 
increase the number of livestock, limitations due to livestock pasture capacity 
will  limit citizens’ income tax base. 
Firearms tax (Ñ2)
According to the average of the last 3 years, the firearms tax  accounts for 0.15% 
of  total budget revenue, which demonstrates the low weight of such type of tax.35 
Due to the perculiarity of the tax,  real chances for higher revenue from this type 
of tax are limited. 
Firearms tax cannot be the main source of tax revenue in budgets of both remote 
and central soums. For example, firearms tax constituted 1.1% of the total budget 
revenue in Kherlen soum in 2007, 0.8% in Jargalant soum, and 0.3% in Ulgii 
soum.  Though in Bayan-Undur soum a relatively high revenue of 2.6 mln tugrugs 
comes from that tax, it constitutes only 0.01% of the total budget revenue.
This tax has a low weight in the soum budget revenue and the chances for wider 
tax basis are limited. For example, there were 1,683 adults in 2007 in Buyant 
soum, who paid 378.0 thousand tugrugs as firearms tax. This number stands 
for approximiately 63 guns.  If all adults in the soum  had weapons, about 1,620 
more guns would be necessary.  In other words, in that case 10.0 mln tugrugs 
of the soum’s budget may come  from firearms tax. This would be 33.9% of 
the Buyant soum’s budget revenue for 2007. However, this is impossible due to 
reasons of national security and protection of fauna.
As revenue from this type of tax is not a mere budget issue, but  is also related 
to social security and environment protection, it is important to properly organize 
collection of the tax.  Soums tax inspectors impose tax based on the data 
provided by the police. According to tax inspectors of Kherlen soum, such data 
may be inaccurate.
State stamp duty (Ñ3)
Though  total revenue from state stamp duty has increased by 1.5 billion tugrugs 
during the past 5 years, its weight in the total budget revenue decreased  from 
7%-to 5%. This is related to  growth of total budget revenue. On the other hand, 
revenue from this type of tax is the highest in Ulaanbaatar city.36 In other words, 
the  amount of this type of tax is high in urban areas with high concentration of 
population. 
35 See Graph 3.24 for details
36 According to the 2007 performance, 87.3% of the total revenue from state stamp duty across the 
country comes from Ulaanbaatar.
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Graph 3.23  Firearms tax in the selected soums (thousand tug)
Source: Data from budget statements for the last two years in the respective soums
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Graph 3.24 Soums tax revenue (comparative data for 2008, in billion 
tugrugs)
Source: Budget data from the Ministry of Finance
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Firearm Tax 0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
State Stamp Duty 2.2 6 6.5 6 7.4 6.3 5.8
Minerals exploration and mining 
license fee 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.4 14.9
Mineral royalty 2.4 2.6 3.9 10.0 31.4 40.7 36.4
Fee for usage of forest wood for 
fuel purpose 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.6 1.8 1.1 1.0
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Stamp duty is a type of payment charged by state organizations for service to 
citizens. It directly depends on population size and availability of state services. 
For example, in central soums with  larger population (Kherlen, Ulgii, Dalanzadgad 
and Bayan-Undur) revenue from this type of tax is relatively high. However, 
according to the 2007 data, 4.2% of the Kherlen soum budget revenue, 17.5% 
of the Dalanzadgad soum budget revenue and less than 1.25% of the other 
soums’ budget revenues was derived from stamp duty. In other words, stamp 
duty cannot be the main basis for some soums’ budget revenues. 
Graph 3.25  Stamp duty in the soums covered by the study (mln/tug)
Source: Data from budget statements for the last two years in the respective soums
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Highly populated central soums have a certain stable tax base, while remote 
soums  have hardly any opportunity to increase their tax base. For example, 
if Jargalant soum aims to gain 5% of its total budget revenue from stamp duty, 
that will be 1.7 mln tugrugs. According to the average of previous years, 0.1 
mln tugrugs were paid in 2007 for provision of public services to 3,048 people 
and 0.2 mln tugrugs were paid in 2008 for provision of public services to 3,009 
people. If calculations were made according to this standard, while not adding 
types of stamp duties, the average for 2009 would be 1.7 mln tugrugs worth 
revenue from public services provided to 25,500 people. As  for Jargalant soum, 
it is not real that its population of 3,000 may grow up to 25,500.  
Hunting royalties and hunting license fees (Ñ4)
According to the study of the last 3 years, hunting royalties and hunting license 
fees have been  decreasing and their weight in the total budget revenue has 
decreased down to 0.7%-0.3%. (Graph: 3.26) In other words, they do not account 
for  the main part of the local budget revenue.  The name of this type of tax attracts 
attention. The General Law on Taxation specified this type of tax as “hunting 
royalty and hunting license fee”. In fact they were included in tax statements as 
“hunting stock payment” and “fee for permission to hunt”. However, payment 
and fee are different types of tax and it is not clear if the payment and fee were 
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reported under one name. The Ministry of Environment issues special permits 
to hunt and charges fees and payment. Afterwards, the Ministry of Environment 
transfers a certain part of  hunting payment to local areas based on  documents 
that prove  hunting of animals in certain local areas. As the local authorities do 
not know whether such transfer is hunting royalty or license fee, they specify it 
as “hunting resource payment”. 
Graph 3.26  Local tax revenue (comparative data for 2008, in billion tugrugs)
Source: Budget data from the Ministry of Finance
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This type of tax depends on hunting resources and the regional features. No revenue 
was generated from this type of tax in soums other than Buyant and Khanbogd for the 
last 2 years.  In Buyant soum 36.4% or 9.3 mln tugrugs of the soum budget revenue 
and in Khanbogd soum 5.8% or 17.7 mln tugrugs of the soum budget revenue came 
from this type of tax in 2007. In 2008 one Altai wild ram was hunted thus adding 4.6 
mln tugrugs to the Buyant soum budget. Meanwhile,  revenue from this type of tax 
has reduced  to 0.5 mln tugrugs in Hanbogd soum. In other words, hunting royalty 
cannot be the source of stable tax revenue to the soum budget. 
Every year the Minister of Environment approves quota for hunting of animals for 
personal and  industrial use. Aimags distribute the number of animals to be hunted 
in their soums within the limits of such quota. Based on the above limits and quota 
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adopted by the aimags, it is possible to estimate and plan hunting royalty. However, 
as  this tax base is not stable and is unlikely to grow, the revenue from this tax has 
no potential to increase.  For example,  Bayankhutag soum does not have especially 
rare species out of the animals assessed by Government Resolution 248 in 2005, but 
there are a few species of the animals assessed as common. However, according 
to environment inspectors, no study or calculation of the number of such species is 
done in the soum.
Graph 3.27  Soums’ budget revenue generated from hunting stock payment 
(mln tug)
Source: Data from budget statements for the last two years in the respective 
soums
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If Khanbogd soum planned to gain at least 10% of the soum budget from hunting 
royalty and estimated a hunting rate of 1 brown deer to be 12,000 tug (under 
Government Resolution 248 of 2005), then it would become necessary to hunt 
2,522 brown deers in average every year. However, according to Decree 46 by 
the Minister of Environment of 2008, the maximum number of brown deers to be 
hunted for personal use in 2009 is 87 over the territory of the whole country.
License fee for usage of natural resources other 
than minerals (Ñ5)
Revenue from license fee for usage of natural resources other than minerals 
was 27.0 mln tug in 2005, reached 126.0 mln tug in 2006 and increased up to 
553.4 mln tug in 2007. (Graph 3.26) However, the percentage of this type of tax 
revenue in the local budget is relatively low – 0.07-0.4%. According to the 2007 
performance, the highest percentage of this type of tax revenue occurred in 
Darkhan-Uul aimag, constituting 88%. It is quite unlear how the types of this tax, 
their coverage and percentage are determined. There may be inaccurate data 
reported after compilation of tax statement data. For example, 487.1 mln tugrugs 
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worth revenue from this type of tax is reported in the Darkhan-Uul aimag’s 
budget. However, close examination of the report reveals that the tax named 
“royalty for common minerals” is included in the report as this type of tax. This 
has to do with  irresponsible acts by  officers compiling the tax statement data. 
In the soums covered by the study, no budget revenue was generated from this 
type of tax.  
Plant harvest charge (Ñ6)
Though the fee for usage of natural plants is specified in relevant laws and  local 
authorities are empowered to set their rate and collect them, there is no tax 
revenue generated from this type of tax either in soums or even at national level. 
This demonstrates lack of  awareness and initiative by local authorities with 
respect to their tax-related powers.  There is no unified activity or organizational 
work  implemented in order to study and determine the source of such tax, its 
imposition and collection. 
Firewood and Timber Stocking and Usage fees (Ñ7)
Though  revenue from the fee for firewood  and timber stocking has increased 
by 345.0 mln tugrugs in average for the past 3 years, its weight in the total 
budget revenue is 1,2%-1,5% (Graph 3.24). In other words, it is a type of tax 
with a low share. This type of revenue also varies across aimags and the capital. 
For example, if, according to the 2007 performance, the highest amount of 
tax revenue – 148.3-162.0 mln tugrugs - was collected in Khuvsgul, Bulgan, 
Selenge, Darkhan-Uul and Arkhangai aimags, there is no such revenue recorded 
for Bayankhongor, Dundgobi, Sukhbaatar and Gobisumber aimags. In other 
words, this type of revenue greatly depends on geographical location of aimags. 
Therefore, there is no source for this type of tax in some aimags without forest 
resources.
Source: Data from the report by the Ministry of Finance
Graph 3.28  Fee for usage of forest wood for firewood  (2007, in mln tug)
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As  for the soums covered by the study, there is no revenue generated from this 
type of payment  in soums except for Khanbogd, Bayan-Undur and Jargalant. In 
other words, these soums do not have a source for this type of tax. Less than 9% 
of the Mongolian territory is taken up by forests. In general, there are no forests 
in the desert and steppe areas. Bayan-Undur and Jargalant are soums located in 
the forest zone and therefore they have  forest resources. Meanwhile, Khanbogd 
soum collected 400-600 thousand tugrugs for its budget in 2007-2008 from 
payment for usage of desert saxaul tree. However, according to Buyan-Ulzii, 
the Deputy Governor of the soum, Khanbogd soum is facing a threat of total 
destruction of the saxaul tree forest  and it is now necessary to limit its usage.  In 
other words, this soum does not have enough source for this type of tax.
Source: Data from budget statements for the last two years in the respective 
soums
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Graph 3.29  Firewood and timber stocking and usage fee in the soums 
covered by the study (mln tug)
KhanbogdDalanzadgadBuyantUlgiiBayankhutagKherlen
In Khanbogd and Bayan-Undur soums, the weight of this type of tax revenue 
in  total budget revenue is very low – less than 0,002%,but in Jargalant soum 
the fee for usage of forest constituted 12.4%-23.8% of total budget revenue in 
2007-2008. If a specific policy on reclamation and forest usage is implemented 
in soums located in zones with forest resources, this type of tax may become a 
stable source of revenue. 
Common minerals royalty (Ñ8)
Common minerals royalty has increased  in the past 3 years by over 140 mln 
tugrugs reaching 303.3 mln tugrugs according to the 2008 revised budget. 
(Graph:3.26) Though this is related to increase of the demand for natural sand, 
gravel  and stone due to the construction sector growth,  revenue from royalty in 
the total local budget was 0.2% in average for the last years. 
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This type of tax is one of the few taxes ,which rate is fixed by the local authorities. 
Mostly, its rate is fixed by the aimag’s Citizens’ Representatives Hural. Natural 
raw materials used for construction of roads, bridges and buildings are the main 
base  of this type of tax. As to the 8 soums covered by the study in 2008, the 
percentage of this type of tax in the total local budget revenue  was as follows: 
1,5% in Dalanzadgad soum, 3,7% - in Khanbogd soum, 0,2% - in Kherlen soum, 
and 0,6% - in Bayankhutag soum, and no revenue was derived from this royalty 
in other soums.
The term “common” does not mean that the mineral is everywhere over the 
territory. The source for this type of tax varies across the soums depending on 
their geographical location and natural structure. For example, Dalanzadgad and 
Kherlen are soums with developing infrastructure, in which  gravel is used for 
the purpose of road, bridge and building construction. They  bring gravel from 
neighbouring soums (Bayankhutag). The Oyutolgoi mine located in Khanbogd 
soum pays royalty for sand and  gravel to the soum budget.  However, there was 
no such revenue in Ulgii and Buyant soums of Bayan-Ulgii aimag and Bayan-
Undur and Jargalant soums of Orkhon aimag. Though Citizens’ Representatives 
Hurals  of these aimags issued relevant acts fixing the rate of the  common 
minerals royalty, the tax base was not determined specifically.  
If infrastructure develops in local areas and  construction works, road building 
and transport intensify accordingly, this type of tax may generate stable revenue 
for  soums budgets. On the other hand, it is not sufficient that local authorities 
only fix the rate of the tax. They need to do research and determine specifically, 
which minerals are common and usable  in their territories.
Source: Data from budget statements for the last two years in the respective 
soums
Graph 3.30 Common minerals royalty (mln tug)
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Water and mineral water usage royalty (Ñ9)
The amount of water and mineral water usage royalty has increased rapidly for 
the past years. For example, if the amount was 278.8 mln tug in 2004, it reached 
2.7 bln tug in 2006. (Graph  3.26)  It is due to the Government’s decision in 
2005 to renew the rate of the royalty.37 The percentage of this type of tax in the 
total local budget has been relatively stable for the past 3 years – 3.4%. It is 
higher than other types of soum taxes. However, because of  local features and 
because the rate for the mineral water utilization royalty is not fixed by the local 
authorities, revenue from this type of royalty is generated mostly from water use 
royalty (excluding Ulaanbaatar).  
37 Government Resolution 7 of 2005
Graph 3.31 Water use royalty (2007, mln tug)
Source: Data on budget from the Ministry of Finance
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According to the 2007 performance of aimags, Bulgan aimag collected 1.4 bln 
tugrugs as water use royalty, which is higher compared to  other aimags.  This is 
due to the Erdenet Mining corporation, which uses water from the aimag water 
resources. Central aimag collected 499.2 mln tugrugs.  In many aimags like 
Gobi-Altai, Khentii, Darkhan-Uul, Ulaanbaatar, Orkhon and Uvurkhangai, no 
revenue was generated from water use royalty. This demonstrates that this type 
of tax has different bases  depending on geographical location of aimags and 
existence of mines at their territory. 
In the soums covered by the study,  only water use royalty   is collected under  this 
type of tax and mineral water utilization royalty is not collected. In other words, on 
the one hand, most soums do not have mineral water sources due to their natural 
structure and regional features, on the other hand, soum’s authorities do not use 
their  legal power to fix the rate of this type of tax and lack resourcefulness.
The graph above shows that  soums with operating mining enterprises collect a 
high percentage of water use royalty. For example, Khanbogd soum collected 
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7.8 mln tugrugs to its budget in 2007 and 3.3 mln tugrugs in 2008 (with the 
percentage of 2.5% in 2007 and 1% in 2008 respectively). The main taxpayer  is 
the Oyutolgoi mine. 
Though the Erdenet mining corporation, located in Bayan-Undur soum, uses a 
lot of water resources, they take  water from Khangal soum of Bulgan aimag.
The base for  water use royalty is closely related to population density, 
development of industry and mining in the area. In Kherlen, Dalanzadgad and 
Bayan-Undur soums, this type of tax revenue comes from royalty paid for usage 
of drinking water, water for personal use and water for provision of services  to 
the population.  In Jargalant soum,  tax revenue was generated from the royalty 
paid for water used in agriculture. .  However,  royalty paid for the personal usage 
of water cannot become the main part of the local budget revenue. For example, 
Bayan-Undur soum (with the  largest population among the soums – 86,866 
people) collected 1.6 mln tugrugs, which is even less than 0,0001% of the annual 
budget revenue. The percentage is 1% in Dalanzadgad soum. 
Royalty paid for water used for mining and other industrial purposes is the main 
source of this type of tax. In other words,  soums with no mining and other 
developed industries have limited chances for  increasing the tax base.
Personal income tax on street vendors and small businesses (Ñ10)
This type of tax is one of the main parts of the personal income tax (Graph 
3.21). It consists of 2 kinds of revenue: the so-called “sample based” one and 
the “patent based”one. Central soums with  larger population size and emerging 
small businesses collect more of this type of revenue. For example, Kherlen, Ulgii, 
Dalanzadgad and Bayan-Undur soums collected more than 10 mln tugrugs. They 
Graph 3.32 Water use and mineral water utilization royalty (mln tug)
Source: Data from budget statements for the last two years in the respective soums
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collected 63.9% of the personal income tax for the last 2 years from this type 
of tax. However, in remote soums this type of tax constitutes only 20% of personal 
income tax (for example, Bayankhutag soum – 2% and Buyant soum – 6%). 
Graph  3.33  Personal income tax on street vendors and small businesses 
whose income is impossible to determine timely (mln/tug)
Source: Data from budget statements for the last two years in the respective soums
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Personal income tax is the main contributor to the soums’ budget tax revenue. 
In central soums, its main part is the tax on individuals’ income from private 
businesses with  income impossible to determine timely, and in remote soums 
its main part is income tax from citizens with livestock. In other words, this type 
of tax is the main source of revenue for the budgets of central soums, while it 
cannot be the main source of tax revenue for the budgets of remote soums. If 
migration from the countryside to the cities continues and  rural areas do not 
develop their infrastructure, this tendency will remain. 
Example 6
...sample-based taxes are calculated  on the basis of tax reports. But as it is not 
possible for individuals to document all their activities , it is not possible to prepare 
such reports.  Even though such reports are prepared, they are biased. On the 
other hand,  consciousness of individual taxpayers is weak and there are many 
people, who do not have skills to write reports.
From an interview with tax inspectors in Bayan-Ulgii aimag 
A “Sample based tax” is paid by a tax payer based on their tax reports. 
Consequently, in  reality such practice highly impacts tax imposition and 
collection, making it biased.   
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Minerals exploration and mining license fee (Ñ11)
Minerals exploration and mining license fee, the so called “shared tax” (50:25:25), 
started to contribute to local budgets in 2008.  According to the revised 2008 budget, 
its revenue of 15.4 bln tugrugs is quite high, thus creating a potential for imbalance. 
This  shared tax is not a stable source of local budget revenue. In other words, 
it is fee in cash paid only when a license for minerals exploration and mining is 
obtained. For example, in 2007, this type of tax contributed 6.1 mln tugrugs to 
Kherlen soums budget and 44.3 mln tugrugs to Bayankhutag soum’s budget. 
In 2008, this type of tax revenue reached 123.1 mln tugrugs, increasing 20 
times in Kherlen soum, but went down to  17.0 mln tugrugs in Bayankhutag soum, 
decreasing 2.6 times. According to the Kherlen soum authorities, as there are 14 
business entities conducting exploration (12) and mining (2) activities in the soum, 
this tax revenue base  is expected to increase in 2009.  However, it is difficult to 
forecast how the revenue will change in the subsequent years.  In Bayan-Undur 
soum, the percentage of  revenue from this type of tax in the local budget is 0.15%, 
which means the tax is not the main source of revenue for the soum budget. 
Source: Data from budget statements for the last two years in the respective soums
Graph 3.34 Minerals license fee (mln tug)
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There is no revenue derived from minerals license fees in other soums. Some 
soums may have no such revenue, because they do not have mineral resources 
and exploration operations are not conducted on their territories.  Along with 
this they may not receive  such revenue because of flaws in tax collection and 
distribution system. For example, as the soum tax inspector B.Dorlig says, though 
there is a Geo Min LLC conducting exploration activities in Buyant soum, not a 
penny  was added to the soum budget from exploration license fees.
Imposition and collection of this type of tax has to be done by the Minerals 
Authority, centralized at the Ministry of Finance and allocated to aimags for 
further allocation to soums.  Due to such multi-stage system, soums often  do not 
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receive  tax revenue.  Because local soum authorities  do not have information 
about businesses, which obtained mining and exploration licenses on their 
territories, money allocated by the Ministry of Finance is less than the amount 
planned and there is not sufficient information about companies that paid taxes, 
it is burdensome for aimags to allocate 25% of the received tax to soums.. For 
example, 2.4 bln tugrugs were collected in Umnugobi aimag in 2008 out of the 5 
bln planned to be collected from minerals license fees. However, no money was 
allocated to soums out of these 2.4 bln. The same situation  was observed in 
Bayan-Ulgii aimag. 
This type of tax may generate different amounts of revenue to budgets of different 
soums, thus causing imbalance in revenues. For example, while  Kherlen soum 
collected 123.0 mln tugrugs for its budget in only one year, Jargalant, Buyant 
and Ulgii soums did not collect any revenue from this type of tax.  It is difficult 
to plan  revenue because the base for such type of tax is not stable for soums 
and soums do not have any powers with respect to tax imposition, collection and 
allocation. 
Minerals royalty (Ñ12)
Revenue from minerals royalty has increased 13 times over the past 5 years from 
2.4 bln to 31.4 bln tugrugs. This number reached 40.7 bln tugrugs according to 
the revised 2008 budget. This type of tax constituted 4.23% in  total local budget 
revenue in 2005, 9.94% in 2006 and 21.6% in 2007. (Graph 3.24) This is directly 
related to the Minerals Law adopted in 2006, under which this type of tax was 
determined as “shared tax”. 
Source: Data on budget from the Ministry of Finance
Graph 3.35  Minerals royalty (2007, mln tug)
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The situation with this type of tax is relatively imbalanced across the aimags. 
According to the 2007 performance, the highest   revenue was collected in Orkhon 
– 14.78 bln, then Selenge – 2.5 bln, Umnugobi – 1.6 bln, Central – 1.4 bln, and 
Sukhbaatar – 1.3 bln. Darkhan-Uul, Zavkhan and Gobi-Altai aimags basically 
do not have this type of revenue. The “shared tax ” created in 2006 granted an 
opportunity for earning high revenues to the zones with a lot of mineral deposits 
and caused imbalance in other zones.
Source: Data from budget statements for the last two years in the respective soums
Graph 3.36  Minerals royalty amount (mln tug)
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Minerals royalty is a relatively stable source of revenue compared to minerals license 
fee,but still  soums face imbalance in revenue distribution. Bayan-Undur soum of 
Orkhon aimag collected 86.9% of its total budget reenue in 2008 only from minerals 
royalty. In other words, the Erdenet mining corporation paid 20.6 bln tugrugs worth 
taxes to the soum budget revenue. However, Buyant, Dalanzadgad and Ulgii soums 
did not collect any revenue from this type of tax for their budgets. As the issue of 
mining of Oyutolgoi, a deposit with significant mineral resources, is not resolved 
yet, Khanbogd soum of Umnugobi aimag cannot derive any revenue from minerals 
royalties. If the deposit is mined, Khanbogd soum will collect such high tax revenues 
that  will be incomparable with other soums.  
Among the soums covered by the study, Bayan-Undur and Jargalant soums of 
Orkhon aimag as well as Ulgii and Buyant soums of Bayan-Ulgii aimag are quite 
different with respect to tax collection and payment. For example, the types of tax 
named as “aimags’ taxes” by the General Law on Taxation and the Unified Budget 
Law (e.g. land fee, immovable property tax, tax on automobile and other  means of 
transport) are included in the soum budget revenue. 
All soums of Bayan-Ulgii aimag finance their expenditures  with subsidies from the 
aimag. In order to ensure effective collection of the tax in soums, the types of tax, 
which are to be paid to the aimag budget and collected from soums, are centralized 
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in the common account for the soum budget revenue. Soum Tax inspectors  report 
tax revenue by each type of the tax. Based on such statement, deductions are 
made from  subsidies granted by the aimag in proportion to  taxes.  This regulation 
is effective since 2003 and, according to Nurgaiv, the head of the tax division of 
Bayan-Ulgii aimag, it helps soums to be responsible in collecting the taxes for their 
budget revenue. 
Orkhon aimag is a highly populated and urbanized aimag. Bayan-Undur soum has 
36,866  residents. The aimag transfers proportional revenue from its budget revenue 
to the state budget. In other words, the aimag tax division works on the territory 
of the soum for tax collection and the soum does not have any competence with 
respect to revenue collection. The tax division is financed from the aimag budget. 
On the one hand, the soum does not have adequate administrative structure for its 
large population, but on the other hand, such practice violates the local governance 
principle declared in the Constitution of Mongolia and the Law on Administrative and 
Territorial Units.  Jargalant soum, together with other soums of Bayan-Ulgii aimag, 
collects its budget revenue from  taxes that generate the aimag’s revenue. Though 
this is a regulation  developed by the aimag authorities, it violates provisions of the 
Unified Budget Law38.   
Likewise, there are problems of legal inflexibility and ones of administrative character 
that arise in the process of generating local budget revenues. 
3.3 ANALYSIS OF NON-TAX REVENUE
The percentage of non-tax revenue in  total local revenue, types of revenue 
constituting the non-tax revenue, their potential  for further increase, differences 
between aimags with respect to non-tax revenue and other issues were defined 
based on examples and data collected from the selected aimags as well as 
detailed statements by the Ministry of Finance.   
While total local revenue has increased by about 10.0 blm tugrugs every year 
since 2003 and by 50% since 2006,  non-tax revenue has remained stable at the 
average rate of 25.0 bln tugrugs.  While the percentage of non-tax revenue in 
total local revenue was 35% in 2003, the rate has decreased by 6% every year 
thus reaching 14% in 2008.
38 Article 10 of the Unified Budget Law
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Graph 3.37 Dynamics of  total local revenue and non-tax revenue growth in 
2003-2008 (comparative data for 2008, in billion tugrugs)
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According to the above graph,  non-tax revenue has not influenced  growth of 
total local revenue remaining stable at about 25.0 bln tugrugs. 
Now let us examine the different types of  non-tax revenue by percentage. 
The only major part of  non-tax revenue is comprised from interests and penalties 
which permanently constituted the average percentage of 40% in 2003-2008.
If operational income and privatization income of state budget organizations 
permanently constituted an average percentage of 10% each, the percentage 
of income from dividends started to grow fast in 2006 reaching 12% in 2006 
compared to 2% in 2005. This is related to the fact that 51% of the coal mine in 
Tsogttsetsii soum of Umnugobi aimag is owned by  local authorities.
Graph 3.38  Percentage of non-tax revenue in  total local revenue in 
2003-2007
Source: Budget revenue data for 2007 from the Ministry of Finance
34.8%
26.5%
22.0%
13.8%
21.1%
14.4%
9.6%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 rev. 2009 pla.
Rational allocation of local budget revenues 87
Graph 3.39 Percentage of types of revenue constituting non-tax revenue
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While rent income constituted 3%-4% in  non-tax revenue and the percentage 
of  income from sale of property constituted 10%, the percentage of other 
unclassified revenue has decreased  every year down to 4% in 2008 compared 
to 26% in 2003.
According to  data prepared by aimags, 62% of  non-tax revenue comes from 
Ulaanbaatar city and 13% comes from Umnugobi aimag. Other aimags have an 
average of 0.7%-1.0%.  Aimags with higher concentration of population such as 
Darkhan, Orkhon, Central and Selenge contribute 2.0%-2.2%. 
Dividends from the coal mine in Tsogttsetsii soum of Umnugobi aimag were 1.0 
bln tug in 2006, 3.0 bln tug in 2007 and 6.0 bln tug in 2008, which constituted the 
major part of  non-tax revenue of the same aimag. 
Graph 3.40  Non-tax revenue collection (2007, by aimags)
Source: Budget revenue data for 2007 from the Ministry of Finance
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  Bayan-Ulgii Umnugobi Khentii Orkhon
  2006 2007 2008 
rev
2006 2007 2008 
rev 
2006 2007 2008 
rev
2006 2007 2008 
rev
1 Dividends    1 096,9 3 015,9 6 021,5 0,0      
2 Rent income      0,0 0,0      
3 Own income of 
state budgeted 
organizations
14,3 17,9 6,0 29,6 27,1 0,0 28,5 52,4 29,4 150,4 198,1 169,4
4 Income from interests 
and penalties
14,9 21,2 12,1 125,8 118,1 162,7 86,1 132,9 91,4 134,8 85,1 134,8
5 Other unclassified 
revenue
57,4 115,1 53,9 42,1 79,7 68,2 107,8 80,0 80,0 140,1 71,2  
6 Income from sale of 
property
 1,1  8,0 45,4 0,0 15,5 134,2 10,0 0,0 343,0 200,0
7 Income from 
privatization
0,2   0,3  0,0 0,0      
NON-TAX REVENUE 86,8 155,4 72,0 1 302,83 286,3 6 252,4 237,9 399,6 210,7 425,2 697,4 504,1
Table 3.8:  Non-tax revenues of the selected aimags
There is  almost no rent income and privatization income in the selected four 
aimags. There is little income from sale of property, but their percentage varies 
across the aimags.
Income from interests and penalties, own income of state budget organizations 
and other unclassified income contribute a certain percentage to the aimag 
budgets every year.  
If income from interests and penalties generates revenue of 15.0 mln tugrugs 
at least or in average in Bayan-Ulgii aimag, it contributes 100.0 mln tugrugs in 
other aimags.
If in Orkhon aimag own income of state budget organizations is 170.0 mln 
tugrugs in average, it is 20.0-30.0 mln tugrugs in other aimags. This is related to 
centralized records of  tax revenue as well as to existence of the Erdenet mining 
corporation at the territory of the aimag. 
Below are defined sources of non-tax revenue, their further tendency to increase 
or decrease and factors to influence them.
1. Dividends from business enterprises with local ownership
According to the data from the Ministry of Finance based on local budget revenue 
statements, there are few aimags, which gain dividends39. It is unclear how many 
shares  is owned by local authorities  in business enterprises. 
39 It is not possible to see from these statements from the Ministry of Finance if the local authorities own 
any shares. But it is possible to see their dividends.
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Income from dividends mainly depends on profitable activities and economic 
growth of the enterprise. This type of revenue has a potential of increasing in 
great measure40.
2. Income from interests and penalties
Revenue is derived from interests and penalties imposed on individuals and 
organizatons ,who violated law in the local area.  It is inappropriate to demand 
payment of interests and penalties by setting a plan of their payment.  Related 
authorities should pay more attention to preventive measures in order to ensure 
strict  compliance with laws by individuals and organizations.
Therefore, it is inappropriate  to gain a major part of the local budget revenue 
from this type of income. It  should be at a stable low rate in order to improve 
responsibility  for law implementation.
3. Own income of state budget organizations
This type of revenue is gained through performance of side-work by state budget 
organizations. This revenue is unlikely to grow in the future, because in the 
current circumstances of market economy there is plenty of private enterprises to 
perform the work. So this type of revenue is unlikely to be regularly generated.
4. Income from rent and tenancy
This type of revenue depends on the local circumstances and management. 
Therefore, it is unlikely to grow.  
5. Income from sale of property
This type of revenue is not stable, because there is limited property in  local 
areas and there is no permanent activity to sell the property.
6. Income from privatization
As already more than 20 years have passed since Mongolia made a transition 
to market economy, there are now very few objects left for privatization. As this 
type of revenue is generated only once, it may be deleted from the law in the 
future. 
7. Other unclassified revenues
There is no revenue, which may fall under this type of revenue, because records 
by the tax authorities are held uniformly across the local areas.
40 There is no specific limit.
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4. ANALYSIS OF LOCAL TAXATION AUTHORITY AND 
TAX REVENUE ASSESSMENT
4.1 AIMAG TAX REVENUE
The impact and delivery of aimag tax revenues as identified by the Law on Central 
Budget of Mongolia – real estate tax, royalty for minerals (20%), land fee, taxes 
for vehicles and other automotives, license fees for mineral exploration (25%) 
– are compared against the classical norms41 of local taxation and the interests 
of the country. In this comparative study, reports of the Finance Ministry and 
data and research collected from the taxation offices of the local governments 
have been used. 
Actual Authority of Local Governments in Local Taxation 
Taxes for vehicles and other automotives, real estate, royalty for minerals, license 
fees are established by the highest authorities through legislation. Therefore, 
local governments have no power to alter or reduce these tax rates. So in the 
sense of “having authority to influence”, it is insufficient to consider the above 
taxes as “local” in its classical meaning. Nevertheless, since the proceeds from 
these taxes are transferred to local governments’ accounts, they can be treated 
as “local revenues”. 
The land fee and its rates can be administered locally within the legal framework 
by the local governments. However, any power on concession or exemption of 
the land fee is legally established, and, thus, the local governments have no 
authority to intervene.
Therefore, from among the legally established local taxes, the land fee is 
comparatively close to the “classical local tax types” authorized to local 
governments.
41 Norms of substantial role of the local government in taxation authority; predictability at the local level; 
local tax collection, etc.
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Predictability 
The authority to award mining licenses and to collect the related fees and charges 
is exercised by competent authorities of the Central Government. Therefore, 
the local governments have very little avenue to predict  expected revenues. 
In addition, despite the standing clause in the law that a consent of the local 
government should be obtained prior to issuing mining licenses, the ambiguous 
statement42 in that clause leads to a situation, where the local authorities would 
have no information on the holder of a license and what part of the local territory 
the license covers.
The local governments independently organize collection of statistical information 
and recording and  tax collection with regard to land fees, real estate taxes, 
Table 4.1:  Taxation Authority of Aimags and the Capital
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1 À1 Real Estate Tax CG CG CG AG AG
2 À2 Municipal Tax This type of tax is yet to be 
launched. No legal framework is 
established.
3 À3 Minerals royalty CG CG CG AG AG, 
CG, SG
4 À4 Exploration and Mining License Fees CG CG CG CG AG, 
CG, SG
5 À5 Vehicle and Automotive Taxes CG CG CG ÀG, 
SG
AG
6 À6 Land Fees CG CG, 
AG
CG AG AG
Explanation:
CG - central government
AG - aimag government
SG - soum government
42 The Law allows that, after having filed an application for a license with the competent central 
authorities, the applicant may wait for the expiry of 30 days designated for obtaining an approval from 
the local government after which the central authorities are forced to issue the license even without 
the local approval.
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vehicle and automotive taxes and others, and have all avenues for a relative 
prediction of their trends.
Except for gold and copper, the royalty payments for minerals are collected by 
the local tax office directly from the taxpayers and are relatively predictable as 
compared to the license fees. For gold and copper, their royalty payments are 
transferred through the central tax administration, and, therefore, have some 
complication and less predictability for the local governments.
Capacity as Long-term Sustainable Source
Î Tax revenues based on local real estates (land fees and real estate taxes) 
present long-term sources for stable income in the local finances.
Movable properties can create tax revenues in a relatively short term. However, 
for example, movable properties like vehicles as a necessity are continuously 
replaced and written off. Therefore, vehicle and automotive taxes act as a long-
term, stable source locally.
Another advantage of these taxes is demonstrated by  incremental increase of 
revenues each year contributed by them as the economy expands.
The royalty for minerals and license fees are those types of tax that produce 
benefits from  natural wealth within a limited time span. In other words,  natural 
resources are not renewable. The respective size and stability of revenues 
depend largely on the life and the annual volume of extraction (production) of 
minerals.
As compared to  immovable property taxes, the minerals-related ones would 
generate a large amount of revenues in a short period, but tend to have a 
relatively short life.
Local Tax Income Gap
A priority policy of the central government is to evenly develop administrative 
and territorial units, so it attempts to distribute evenly budget revenues. In other 
words, population should receive public services of equal quality and amount 
regardless of the territory they reside in.
The study showed that urbanized aimags with large population differ substantially 
from rural aimags. The present law does not take into account the disparities, 
which does not meet the actual demand.
That is why a status of “a city” should be introduced in the legal frame and legal 
basis for its budget and financing should be developed. Budgets and financing of 
sparsely populated rural aimags with relatively large areas, based on agriculture 
should be considered separately. 
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Natural wealth is an important, but non-renewable resource. Thus, by treating 
this wealth as not local, but national endowment, and redistributing the proceeds 
equally among the entire population would help narrow the income gap.
Today the bulk of local tax revenues in this country is  generated by the mining 
sector, which widens the income disparity among aimags depending on their 
minerals development.
Assessment of the Tax Base
The assessment on the tax base made in the previous part reveals that taxes 
are different with  regard to a city and an aimag. Aimags differ as those  with 
mineral deposits and  without such deposits. This leads to a gap in generation of 
budget revenues among the local governments. Among the 4 aimags selected 
as samples, Bayan-Ulgii as the representative of those aimags less endowed 
with minerals collects the lowest amount of license fees and royalties.
Ulaanbaatar City with the highest population density produces 50-60% of its 
revenues solely from real estate taxes, land fees and vehicle and automotive 
taxes. In aimags regardless to their population size or budget expenditure these 
taxes are evenly distributed and less diverse.
The tax base of this type of taxes is evenly distributed in rural aimags. In the future, 
taxation authority and power to set tax rates should be given to local authorities, 
so that aimags shall introduce a tax policy conducive to local specifics, which 
will give them an opportunity to increase their tax revenue. An issue of bringing 
evaluation of assets of population and land value close to market prices and 
putting them in economic turnover is especially important. 
The royalty and license fees for minerals are derived from the mineral resources 
in rural areas, so  urban areas lack a tax base.  The volume of these taxes 
is dependent on the world market prices for minerals, which will directly affect 
exploration and mining activities.The short-term potential of these taxes to 
increase revenues, thus, is classified as “uncertain”.
4.2 SOUM TAX REVENUES
At present, 12 types of taxes stipulated by the General Tax Law and the Central 
Budget Law of Mongolia constitute the tax revenues of soums. These so called 
soum tax revenues are not legally independent, for they are levied and their 
rates are established by the central government, and the local governments 
have no right to grant a concession and exemption. Thus they have lost their 
meaning of local (soum) tax revenues. Though local governments have some 
rights to establish  rates of several taxes, this right does belong  not to soum 
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governments, but to the aimags’Citizens’ Representatives Hural (tax revenues 
in C6, C8, and C9 of Table 4.2). In reality they are called aimag or soum tax 
revenues only based on which budget they are channeled to. 
Explanation:
CG –Central Government
AG –Aimag Government
SG – Soum Government
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3 C3 State stamp duties CG CG CG SG SG
4 C4 Usage fee on hunting stock, permit 
fee for hunting or catching wild 
animals
CG CG CG SG SG
5 C5 Permit fee for exploitation of natural 
resources other than minerals
 No designated regulatory 
mechanism for taxation
6 C6 Plant harvest charge CG AG CG, 
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7 C7 Firewood and timber stocking and 
usage fees
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8 C8 Common minerals royalty CG AG CG SG SG
9 C9 Water and mineral water usage fee CG CG, 
AG
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10 C10 Personal income tax on street vendors 
and small businesses whose production 
and service can not be categorized for 
the tax purposes
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11 C11 25% of license fees for exploration 
and exploitation of minerals
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12 C12 10% of the royalty for mineral deposit CG CG CG CG, 
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Table 4.2  Analysis of Taxation Authority of Soums
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As for these taxes, the soum has been reduced to as a unit of the central 
government structure that is responsible only for levying and collecting taxes. 
There is no legal environment yet for soums to take initiatives on regulation, 
revenue increase and tax collection. Although every country has a common 
practice whereby the highest government institutions establish the maximum 
and minimum threshold for tax rates, it is the local authorities, who normally have 
the right to fix the actual rates.
A fact that soum tax revenues constitute about 40% of the total local tax 
revenues demonstrates an increasing concentration of the tax base in the local 
communities. Since most of the so called soum taxes (12 types as defined by 
law) have a low value, the soum tax income is made in fact by personal income 
tax, 10% share of the soum in the royalty payment for minerals, state stamp duty, 
and mining license fee.
44 See map 3.1: “Share of soum tax revenues in the total tax income”.
Table 4.3  Share of the Soum Taxes (average of last 3 years)
Tax Share Soum Taxes
1 Above 20% - 10% of minerals royalty payment
- Personal income tax
2 6%-20% - Stamp duty
- 25% of exploration & exploitation license fees of mining
3 0%-5% - Other tax revenue
It can observed recently that the share of the personal income tax and state stamp 
duty is decreasing, while that of minerals royalty and license fee is increasing44. In 
other words,  tax contribution generated by mining is growing. The tax base related 
to mineral deposits (mining industries) is diverse and unequally distributed from 
soum to soum. The personal income tax and state stamp duty are the tax revenues 
closely correlated with the population size, economic development, public services 
in a particular soum and are balanced (there are large or small, different tax bases 
in each soum).
Though the tax revenue and base derived from  mineral deposits are increasing, 
their uneven distribution creates a budget income  disparity at the local (soum) level. 
Since this tax base is set to increase further, the income gap among administrative 
units will widen, if  redistribution of tax revenues does not take place.
The base for taxes other than those generated by mineral deposits and mining 
production has an insignificant potential to increase (some tax bases may grow 
along with  development of infrastructure and mining). Nevertheless, if the local 
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governments engage in entrepreneurship, develop infrastructure and create jobs, 
the tax base for revenues from personal income tax, stamp duty and others has 
a full potential to grow. More efforts are needed as well in terms of research and 
identification of unused sources45 of the tax base and organization of fair and flexible 
mechanism for tax collection.
Taxes such as personal income tax and state stamp duty have considerable 
differences in urban and rural areas. Especially the components of personal income 
tax are substantially different46.
4.3 ASSESSMENT OF NON-TAX REVENUES
From among the non-tax revenue types, property  privatization income and 
property sales proceeds may cease to exist in the future and might produce 
one-time revenues for the local governments.
Own income and rental revenues of the government organizations may exist 
for a longer period, but they will not grow because of their independence from 
economic development.
Since the overdue charges and other fines have  a purpose of improving  law 
enforcement, the revenues thereof shall not be planned and placed a high 
importance in the local income. This kind of revenue will exist for a certain period 
in the future, but it will not bring significant sustainable revenue  to local areas as 
it has a different role.
The rates of the above charges and fines are established by the General Tax Law 
and the Law on Administrative Responsibilities. Therefore, the local governments 
have no authority  in this respect.
As can be seen from the case of South Gobi aimag, dividends from shares can 
become a stable source of local income. The local authorities can provide support 
to, if not to influence directly, the profitable operation of the respective companies.
 To sum up, it can be concluded that non-tax incomes do not constitute substantial 
revenue to the local governments, their potential to grow is limited and they can 
only contribute small stable income to the budget.
45 No data is available, for example, for plant harvest charges (C6) in aimags and soums.
46 Studies show that in rural soums personal income tax of herdsmen is the major contributor while in 
the cities personal income tax on street vendors and small businesses whose production and service 
can not be categorized for the tax purposes is overwhelming. 
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5. FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND DISTRIBUTION PRINCIPLE
The central budget transfers in any country constitute the core part of the local 
budget irrespective of income sources and size.
The share of theses transfers in the local budget and their distribution principle 
and application mechanisms differ from country to country. For example, the share 
of transfers in the local budget is 70-80% in Italy, Britain and the Netherlands; 
50-70% in Greece, Portugal and Spain; 40-50% in Germany and Belgium; 30-
40% in the USA, Australia, Japan and France; 20-30% in Finland, Sweden, 
Denmark, New Zealand, Canada and Austria. The transfer distribution principles 
must deal more with the transfer policy outcome rather than with instruments of 
ways of distribution (Bird, 1993). In other words, the principles must ensure the 
distribution efficiency and adequacy and the macroeconomic stability.
Therefore, an adequately organized transfer mechanism provides for  efficiency 
and effectiveness of the local budget even when the transfer share is very high. 
Similarly, without a well-organized mechanism, a transfer that occupies a smallest 
share in the local budget can not meet the above conditions. Consequently, what 
matters the most is not the extent to which local budgets depend on the central 
government transfers, but the way it depends on it.
The main role of the transfers is to ensure the vertical and horizontal balance 
of the budget. The budget balance deals with two key issues of local financial 
relations. First, it aims to ensure the balance of income and expenditure of 
administrative units of various levels. It means that the local governance shall 
have a sufficient financing in order to fulfill its mission. Second, its purpose is 
to narrow the gap between administrative units of the same level in terms of 
demand for expenditure and capacity for income generation47.
Many factors influence the transfer allocation. First of all, there is a need to 
identify the role and function of the local administration itself, and to estimate the 
size of transfers in correlation with the administrative costs.48 
47 S  See more in Fiscal Equalization in South Eastern Europe, Gabor Peter; Budapest, LGI
48 Services and function of the local administration required by law are called “Mandatory public service”, 
meaning the sole and political responsibility for the quality of services.
Rational allocation of local budget revenues102
The next factor is the size of an administrative and territorial unit.  In other words, it 
will depend on the population size of a given unit. Countries, where the population 
density is low, treat the transfer very carefullybecause, small administrative units 
have a weak capacity to generate revenues. In  developed countries like Island, 
France, Greece, Austria and Spain, the lowest administrative units have the 
smallest  population size of 1,000 to 5,000; in Canada, the USA, Germany and 
Norway – 5,000-10,000; in Belgium, Denmark and Australia – 15,000-20,000; in 
Sweden and Portugal – 30,000-35,000; in Ireland and New Zealand – 40,000-
50,000; and in Britain – over 100,000.
Another factor to influence the transfer allocation is the capacity of the local 
governments to generate their own revenues. This depends on their tax base, 
the principle of tax shares and the ability to collect taxes. Considering this 
factor, more transfers are allocated to those units  that have a limited capacity to 
generate revenues.
In the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, there are 
following three major models of transfer allocation:
1. Transfers filled in the gap. This is a type of transfer from the central budget 
with special designation for the purpose of filling in the gap between the 
potential expenditure and estimated revenue. This model is based on 
the allocation negotiated between the central and local governments. 
In other words, the highest level of government will control and decide 
the local government’s functions and expenditure limits. In this case, 
local administrations will have low interest in increasing its income  and 
responsible and independent operations. They will rely on the central 
budget and will prefer an easy life. Extra revenues on top of the planned 
will lead to a cut in transfers. This model is identical to what we practice 
in Mongolia in terms of the financial support the central budget provides 
to the local governments.
2. General grant. This model provides for matching to certain service 
indicators, when the central budget transfers funds to the local 
governments. At the same time, no limitation is imposed on the power 
of transfer expenditure. Examples of the service indicators include the 
population size, its age structure, service recipients (number of pupils, 
number of hospital beds). This model allows a larger freedom in planning 
and expenditure of local budget and stimulates the interest of local income 
expansion.
3. This is the  most complicated model and it is treated with  substantial 
caution in transfer allocation. It is called a model of standardized 
expenditure and revenue capacity. The transfer allocation is based on 
a difference between standardized expenditure and local revenue. The 
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local expenditure is standardized and calculated with use of a formula. 
The local revenue is estimated at the minimum or potential average. 
After assessing the above two indicators, the difference is allocated as 
transfer.
This transfer model is more effective than the other two in terms of budget 
balancing. The expenditure is based on a common standard. The real expenditure 
difference of each administrative unit is treated individually. The unit with a limited 
revenue capacity will receive  a larger transfer and will be responsible for ensuring 
the inflow of the planned average revenue. If the local administration falls short 
of the planned average revenue level, the difference will not be compensated. If 
its revenue exceeds the planned level, that will not serve as a reason to cut the 
transfers.
The transition countries have applied a constructive solution for the budget 
balancing transfers with combination of these three models.
5.1 State of Financial Support Allocation in Mongolia
A majority of aimags and soums in Mongolia finance their expenditure with the 
financial support from the central budget and the aimag budget, respectively.
Currently, the local budget expenditure includes (i) the budget of aimag and soum 
governors and their offices; (ii) operational costs of aimag and soum  Citizens’ 
Representatives Hurals; (iii) operational costs of bags; and (iv) investment. Each 
fiscal year, aimags prepare the budget expenditure draft based on the previous 
year and the local revenue plan and submit them to the Ministry of Finance. 
The Ministry examines the draft budget, estimates  compensation for shortages 
through a financial support to those aimags, which are unable to balance their 
budget, and have the draft budget approved by the Cabinet and the State Great 
Hural. The approved financial support is then considered by the Aimag Hural of 
Citizens’ Representatives and allocated to soums.
The capital city and 5 aimags in Mongolia are self-sufficient in finances and 
the rest of aimags receive transfers from the central budget. For these aimags, 
between 4 to 60 percent of the total expenditure are financed through central 
budget transfers. This indicator is the highest, or above 43 percent, in the 5 
western aimags. It is related to  limited sources of local income in these aimags 
(see Table 5.1).
The amount of currently allocated transfers is sufficient only for  locally responsible 
expenditure or  operational costs of  local government offices. Based on the 
theory of central-local financial relationship and  international experience, we 
will analyze the state of implementation of the following principles of the transfer 
mechanism in Mongolia. 
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Graph 5.1  Local Revenue and Financial Support of Aimag Budget 
(2007 figures)
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Table 5.1  Share of Local Revenues in Total Budget Expenditure of Aimags
Source: 2007 Budget Revenue Report, Ministry of Finance
Share of local own 
revenues in total 
expenditure 
Number Aimags
1 31-50 8
Bayan-Ulgii, Gobi-Altai, Dundgobi, Zavkhan, 
Central, Khovd, Gobi-Sumber, Uvs
2 51-70 4 Arkhangai, Bayankhongor, Huvsgul, Khentii
3 71-90 3 Dornod, Uverkhangai, Sukhbaatar
4 91-100 7
Bulgan, Dornogobi, South Gobi, Selenge, 
Darkhan-Uul, Ulaanbaatar, Orkhon
5.2 Transfer Allocation Principle 
An established principle of central-to-local transfer does not exist in Mongolia. 
Aimags submit to the Finance Ministry their income-expenditure plans. The 
Ministry calculates the required transfer amount on the basis of the previous 
year’s implementation of income-expenditure plan with some modification 
for expected changes in the current year. The State Great Hural debates and 
approves each year the local budgets. Extending financial support on the basis of 
annual negotiations on the income-expenditure differences leads to a weakened 
Source: Budget revenue report 2007, Ministry of Finance
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responsibility for mobilizing local revenues and relying more on budget support 
from the upper instances.
Such a state of affairs also feeds the interests of some self-sufficient aimags and 
soums to inflate their expenditure and to minimize their contribution to the central 
budget. For example, the South Gobi aimag appropriates its excess revenues 
to its “My Land Endowment” fund and distributes the proceeds to its citizens in 
cash. Such a cash distribution falls into a category of social welfare and transfer 
services and is not allowed by law at the local level.
Predictability 
It is not possible for aimags and soums to estimate in advance and predict the 
size of financial support from the central budgetfor the current support system is 
not based on objective factors such as the population size, the number of service 
recipients, remoteness of territory, the number of administrative units, and unit 
costs of services. It is based only on mutual agreement to finance the actual 
difference between expenditure and income. There is no formula to calculate the 
financial support. Therefore,  financial support can not serve as a predictable, 
guaranteed source of revenues.  
Guarantee 
A fact of submission of transfer proposals through the Finance Ministry to the 
Parliament for approval  reduces the level of guarantee that the fundamental 
principles of local income sources be protected by law. The principle of transfers 
and the key indicators of its calculations are established by law in the  developed 
countries and in the post-communist countries of Eastern and Central Europe. In 
our case,  codification of treatment of the local budget as an integral part of the 
central budget has eliminated  legally independent local budget management. In 
other words, the local budget does not stand as independent and separate, but 
as an integral component of the central budget. Such a state of affairs stems from 
a substantial logical misunderstanding dictated by the Constitutional statement 
that Mongolia is a unitary state and has a single budget. Being a unitary state 
means that its territory is divided into administrative and territorial units and it 
has a unified legal system, but it does not amount to codification of centralized 
governance and single budget.49
49 Tony Levitas, Rethinking State-Local Relation in Mongolia Today: Possible Directions for Local 
Government Reform, UNDP Local Government Support Project , June, 2008; takes up in detail 
numerous challenges and difficulties faced by Mongolia’s local governance and stemming from the 
illusion of a unitary state.
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A local budget system requires to be regulated by a special law and to be legally 
independent and guaranteed. This is a question of, first, codification of separation 
of functions for the local government and  public management; secondly, 
codification of local taxation authority and financial support principles.
Ensuring the Budget Balance
It was noted at the beginning of this Chapter that the principle goal of any transfer 
mechanismwas to ensure the vertical and horizontal balance of budget.
There are two methods of checking whether today’s financial support mechanism 
ensures the budget balance. First, we will look at  per-capita distribution of 
total local revenues. This measure will be only convenient when the central 
government aims at equalizing  per-capita income. Moreover, the local income 
generation capacity is not included in the estimation.
A regression analysis is used to examine the correlation between the per-capita 
financial support, the financial capacity and the demand variable of expenditure. 
If demand variables of population and poverty increase the support amount, 
while the financial capacity decreases it, it is considered to ensure the balance. 
An estimation of the 2007 figures has revealed that the current financial transfers 
have a considerable balancing role.
For example, here we have studied the per-capita GDP of aimags and 
unemployment, and presented their correlation with  per-capita financial support50 
(table 5.2).
The aimag’s per-capita GDP seems to have no influence on the amount of 
financial support. This means that it does not depend on the aimag’s financial 
capacity. But when the unemployment rate is higher, in other words, when the 
demand for expenditure grows, the size of financial support increases. Also 
when the share of agriculture in the aimag’s GDP is higher, the size of financial 
support increases. It illustrates that the financial support distribution principle in 
our country is directed only at financing expenditure needs regardless of output 
indicators of the given aimag. Therefore, it is necessary to change the present 
financial support distribution principle.
If we include the royalty payment for minerals in the equation, the correlation 
becomes weaker. In any case we can say that balancing between aimags 
does not work well as for 2008. In addition,  current financial support does not 
strengthen the local revenue capacity. 
50 See more in the report by B. Tumennast; Open Society Forum’s Compilation: Responsible Government: 
Financial Centralization, Local Self Administration. Ulaanbaatar 2008, pp. 72-78
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 I II
Constant -5.948 -3.009
(10.197) (10.102)
Population 0.226 -0.053
(1.165) (1.146)
Aimag’s per capita GDP 0.391 0.535
(1.854) (1.802)
Unemployment 4.332** 3.598*
 (1.760) (1.782)
Share of animal husbandry in GDP 2.041** 1.782*
 (0.943) (0.932)
Minerals Royalty -0.298
 (0.207)
Adj. R2 0.48 0.51
N 22 22
Standard deviation is in parenthesis. ***,**,* denote significance at 1,5,and 10 % 
respectively. All variables are in logarithm.
Table 5.2  Balancing Test (Regression method)
Per capita financial support is the dependent variable)
Source: Ministry of Finance, Central Statistical Office
As  large mineral deposits in a few aimags become commercial,  allocation from 
the minerals royalty to aimags will increase over the years,but other aimags will not 
benefit from the increase. This will lead to a further gap in budget balancing.
Map 5.2 below presents per-capita budget indicators of aimags. The per-capita 
local revenue is the highest in aimags such as Orkhon and South Gobi, while 
the lowest is in Uvs, Bayan-Ulgii, Zavkhan. The ratio of the highest and the 
lowest is 1 to 19. After  financial support from the central budget is injected, the 
ratio of per capita expenditure for the highest and the lowest becomes 1 to 4, 
which indicates that the current negotiations-based financial support mobilizes 
resources from the high income aimags and redistributes them to the low 
income ones. Nevertheless, the disparity between aimags in terms of per capita 
expenditure remains high. In other words, the horizontal balancing of budget is 
not working.
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Source: Estimates based on the 2007 local fiscal report provided by the Ministry 
of Finance. The per-capita indicators are in thousand tugriks.
Graph 5.2  Per-capita Fiscal Indicators in Aimags 
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The difference between the tax amount paid by the local population of aimags 
and the public services provided in return is called net fiscal benefit. This benefit 
varies among regions and administrative units depending on non-market reasons 
or decisions of the central government. If this variation is the reason for internal 
migration of citizens, then it is considered that the horizontal budget balancing 
among regions is not ensured. For example, according to the above concept the 
fiscal revenue of South Gobi aimag might increase substantially and its citizens 
may enjoy services of higher standard as compared to the citizens in Khovd 
aimag. Consequently, the citizens of Khovd might migrate to South Gobi aimag. 
A fact that the local governments do not have taxation authority, or while the 
personal income tax rates are same throughout the administrative units, their 
budget income and expenditure are considerably different, manifests that there 
is a strong need for a mechanism to ensure the horizontal budget balancing. 
This is not to be solved by delegating the taxation authority to local governments 
and sharing the tax proceeds with them. The only solution is to establish a new 
mechanism of financial support to the local governments.
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6. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RATIONAL ALLOCATION OF 
LOCAL BUDGET REVENUES
The analysis  of local taxation authority, tax revenues and financial support 
presented in the previous chapters reveals the following state of affairs in this 
country:
1. The local tax revenue base is concentrated in a few aimags with high 
population density and developed industry, trade and services. These include 
the capital city of Ulaanbaatar, Orkhon and Darkhan.
2. In aimags with large mineral deposits and mines, local taxes such as royalty, 
land fee, water usage fee, generate higher revenues as compared to other 
aimags. This might lead to a further disparity in the horizontal budget 
balancing. Such a trend can be observed on  the examples of Orkhon, South 
Gobi and Selenge. The above conclusion suggests that there are only 5-6 
aimags with a sufficient tax base, which is about one-third of all aimags.
3. At the soum level, the population is small and the economy is underdeveloped, 
which severely limits the potential to expand the tax base. Some soums 
with several mineral deposits and soums at the center of aimags with some 
concentration of population present a certain potential for an expansion of 
the tax revenue sources.51 Out of total 340 soums of Mongolia only 10% have 
such a potential.
4. Large mineral deposits of strategic significance are distributed unevenly and 
located in a few aimags only.
5. The income generation capacity of administrative units is not adequate. Only 
a few have a sufficient capacity, while the majority  does not.
6. Criteria of transparency, guarantee and predictability of financial support of 
the central budget to the local governments are not met.
The above reality dictates that the following policy is pursued and reforms are 
undertaken to rationalize the central-local budget relations. The key policy 
recommendations are, as follows: 
51 There are legal justifications to this statement, for as of 1 January 2009 the proceeds of income taxes 
on salaries and wages are left to the local government; 10% of the royalty is transferred to the local 
budget. 
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(i) “to expand the local taxation authority, 
(ii) to reform the tax distribution, 
(iii) to create a new mechanism for financial support (transfer) in order to 
strengthen  autonomy of administrative units and 
(iv) to rationalize the central-local budget relations”.
Within the above policy recommendation, the following three directions of local 
budget reforms are suggested:
I. To expand the taxation authority of local self-administering organizations 
and to introduce some reforms in the current local tax allocation
II. To reform the distribution mechanism of financial support in order to 
ensure the balance of budget
III. To delegate some public services functions to the local governments and 
to provide  respective financing
6.1. EXPANDING LOCAL TAXATION AUTHORITY 
Based on the study of the local budget revenue and taxation authority and 
outcomes of the selected research for 4 aimags and 8 soums, we are proposing 
the following policy reforms of the current budget revenue allocation and the 
local taxation authority. The reform proposals are summarized in Table 6.1.
Trends of theory, practices in foreign countries and specifics of this country are 
taken into account in making the choice of appropriate levels of central and local 
governments for the purpose of authorizing different types of taxation. In terms 
of theory, it is a question of applying principles of ensuring the adequacy of 
delegation of tax authority to different levels of government, of ensuring  efficiency 
and effectiveness of such a delegation.
Efficiency of delegation is about  the most beneficial and optimal choice of the 
level of government for spending and allocation of tax revenues. According to the 
decentralization theorem of Oates, the cost of a service is defined by the tax amount 
the local voters are willing to pay for the service. The mechanism of rational distribution 
prefers to have  decisions being made at the lowest level of government.52
There is a concept that the immediate recipients of local services shall pay for 
the cost of service.
In some cases these three concepts conflict with each other. Thus, finding a 
solution of the choice of a level of central and local government for delegating 
52 See more in Stephen J.Bailey, Local Government Economics, Principles and Practice, 1999, (London: 
Macmillan Press Ltd).
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the taxation authority becomes complicated and controversial. However, we are 
not talking here about finding the only best solution, it should be resolved in the 
frame of general principles to be followed, experience of other countries and real 
conditions of our country.
As in other countries, Mongolia applies common national taxes of economic 
entity, sales, excise, and customs.
From a view of income redistribution, these taxes shall stay as central 
government taxes rather than being delegated to local governments. Since 
these taxes generate large revenues, the priority shall be placed in ensuring 
equitable application rather than in profitability and transparency.53 Delegating 
these taxes to local governments or sharing with the latter is not appropriate, 
for local governments with higher income will have interests to distribute these 
revenues to the citizens of their own thus aggravating the income gap of those 
local governments, which have low income. In the case of Mongolia, most 
of  industrial and trade entities are concentrated in the capital city, and just a 
few large mining entities (like Erdenet copper mine) generate a bulk of the tax 
revenues. These facts demonstrate that the above taxes shall stay at the central 
government.  Most of  developed countries have a similar practice.
The sales tax or the VAT has the same nature as the corporate tax. If  taxation 
authority is given to  local governments, then large cities with a high concentration 
of population might prefer to levy a higher VAT. Then their citizens will opt for 
purchasing goods outside the high VAT region, which would result in a “tax 
export”. It means that non-residents will pay the taxes. These people will jot tale 
part in the decision-making on local services, while the residents, who pay less 
tax will have the advantage of making decisions and participating in elections. 
In this sense, sales taxes are better in the hands of regional governments rather 
than the local.International experience suggests that  authority to establish the 
rates shall rest with the central government. In the case of this country, the 
current practice of collecting and establishing the rates of VAT by the central 
government and redistributing to aimags shall remain intact. For the purpose 
of transparency in distribution, the return of a part of the VAT, generated by a 
particular aimag, shall be based on additional factors like the population size, so 
that it becomes a transparent, guaranteed income source.54 Or it can take a form 
of income sharing. For example, 90% of the VAT proceeds are channeled to the 
central budget, and 10% - to the local budget.
53 Stephen J.Bailey, Local Government Economics, Principles and Practice, 1999, (London: Macmillan 
Press Ltd); pp. 155-157
54 The current principle applied by the Finance Ministry in the VAT return to aimags is unknown.
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Proposals with regard to the Aimag Taxation Authority
In considering  income redistribution of local tax proceeds, a differential treatment 
of tax bases and specifics of rural aimags and municipalities is needed. The 
current taxation and budget laws liken aimags to the capital city and soums 
to city districts. The Constitution specifies the capital city and its districts as 
administrative units, but stops short of defining the status of cities (towns).55 City 
(town) administrative units with large population, developed industries and trade, 
and a small territory have a number of differences as against the rural aimags. 
For example, the main tax base is related to employment, real estate taxes and 
land fees levied on economic entities and organizations. At the same time, the 
proceeds from royalty and common minerals are minimal.
In rural aimags, income taxes of herdsmen, royalty of mineral deposits and 
exploitation fees of common minerals are the main components of the tax base, 
while taxes related to employment and real estate are insignificant.
Vehicle and Automotive Taxes
It is suggested that the central government exercises  authority to establish 
the general rates of this type of tax, while local governments be given the right 
to establish the rates within certain boundaries and to levy and  authorize tax 
concessions. Local governments with taxation authority on vehicle will be able to 
allocate proceeds to construction and upgrading of roads and bridges, which will 
improve  distribution efficiency and expenditure transparency. This will also help 
direct the taxation policy to minimize  air pollution and CO2 emission by old cars 
and trucks. The taxes on vehicle shall be delegated to the aimag governments.
Land Fees
The land fee proceeds from mining are very high in a few aimags. Therefore, in 
order to balance  income distribution, the proceeds shall be redistributed through 
central and aimag budgets (cross-budget fund). How the reallocation would work, 
how does it fit into the system of intergovernmental finances, what will happen 
with those aimags who presently benefit a lot from these revenues? The 2007 
land fee proceed in Orkhon, for example, was the highest – 7.0 billion, while the 
lowest was recorded in Sukhbaatar to the amount of 16.1 million only. The Orkhon 
land fees are paid mostly by the Erdenet Copper-Molybdenum Complex.
Payment of the other land fees56 is suggested to remain at the local government, 
which is the current practice.
55 Articles 57.1 & 58.1 of the Constitution of Mongolia
56 Commercial usage and ownership of lands by citizens and economic entities.
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Real Estate Taxes
It is suggested that the current system of redistributing  proceeds from this type 
of taxes to local governments  should remain. However, if local governments 
are given authority to establish the rates within certain boundaries, then this 
will improve  efficiency and provide an opportunity to pursue a taxation policy 
conducive to their specifics. For example, the overpopulated Ulaanbaatar City 
may establish higher tax rates for real estate to reduce  concentration and to 
encourage the movement of capital to regions with lower tax rates.
In our country  citizens’ dwellings are fully exempted from real estate taxes and 
are charged only 2-3% of the nominal land fees. Over 90% of this type of taxes is 
generated by proceeds from the real estate taxes paid by businesses. A fact that 
urbanization in this country is very young is the reason for a weak real estate tax 
base. On the contrary,  European countries generate a considerable part of the 
local budget proceeds from real estates owned by citizens and households.
Royalty for Mineral Deposits
The current practice of sharing  royalty proceeds among the central, aimag and 
soum budgets shall be revised. We propose to appropriate all royalties into the 
central budget for a balancing purpose. Or  a 30% provision of royalty retention 
at local budget shall be changed to establish a cross-budget fund, from  which 
it is redistributed among aimags as transfers. For aimags with active mining 
industries, a provision might exist to retain  royalty proceeds all 100%. Then in 
order to finance recreation of mining sites, to compensate for displacement of 
local population and for factors undermining  traditional economic activities. The 
rate of royalty shall be established on the basis of real production factors.
Fees for mining exploration and exploitation licenses shall be fully appropriated 
into the central budget and redistributed. Or the current practice of 50% local 
retention shall be changed to establish a cross-budget fund from which  the 
proceeds shall be redistributed.
Proposals with regard to  Soum Taxation Authority
1. The personal income tax is one of the main components of soum budget 
revenue structure and is related to the population and socio-economic 
development situation of the soum. Starting from 2009, tax proceeds from 
salaries, wages and similar personal incomes are retained at the local (aimag) 
budget. The components and shares of personal income tax are different 
for urban and rural units. Therefore, the remote or rural soum budgets may 
retain the entire income taxes on salaries and wages. As for the centrally 
located or largely populated soums, a certain percentage of the personal 
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income tax proceeds may be retained, while the rest be appropriated into 
aimag budgets (or fully appropriated into aimag budget and redistributed as 
matching transfers). In other words,  centrally located soums will practice 
taxation shared by aimag and soum.
 Such a regulation will create for soums with no mineral deposits and a weak 
tax base a potential to expand its personal income tax base. For example, 
in 2007 Bayankhutag Soum of Khentii Aimag generated 24% of its budget 
revenues from personal income taxes and transferred to the central budget 
7.3 million tugriks (10.3% of the total revenues) as tax proceeds from salaries 
and wages. If this amount was retained at the local budget, then the personal 
income tax will have produced up to 34 percent of revenues.
2. Taxes related to mineral deposits create disparities of budget revenues at the 
soum level. Therefore, proceeds from these taxes shall not be shared with 
the local governments. Instead, they shall be collected wholly by the central 
government. Such centralized tax proceeds may be redistributed as financial 
support to the local governments. In doing so, certain financial resources 
shall be retained at the local budget to compensate for ecological damages 
and for rehabilitation purposes..
3. There is a need to study in detail  taxes established by law, but not collected 
at the local level, and to analyze the tax base. Also important is to identify 
new types of tax that might present a potential for the local government and 
to create a new tax base.
 For example, local governments do not administer plant harvest charges. 
They need to take an initiative to study this type of taxation and its base. 
There is also an urgent requirement to define the tax base and streamline 
tax collection for municipal tax, pet tax, inheritance and gift tax, which are 
stipulated by law.
 Transparent, sustainable and controlled exercise of exploitation of common 
minerals, wild animal hunting, water and mineral water usage, and plant 
harvesting, shall be carried out by the soum administration with  participation 
of citizens and entities. Looking at  mineral wealth as only a tax income source 
is prone to cause ecological damages to the nature. In the future, extraction 
of gold and other non-renewable natural resources shall be bannedA policy 
of expansion and full utilization of tax base and taxes related to employment, 
businesses, properties, commercial activities at the soum shall be pursued. 
The proposals for  soum taxation authority are summarized in Table 6.1.
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6.2 REFORMING  TRANSFER SCHEMES IN ORDER TO PROVIDE 
BUDGET BALANCE 
Despite some expansion of taxation authority of local governments and 
redistribution of some tax income (wages and salaries) to local authorities, most 
of aimags and soums are not capable to self finance their expenditure. Therefore, 
the central government’s financial support through an inter-budget fund57 shall 
become the major source of local income.
Establishing the inter-budget fund by law will make the local budgets sustainable, 
guaranteed and predictable. The inter-budget fund may consist of the central 
government’s financial support to local budgets, shared tax revenues for budget 
balancing, loans and aid to local governments. Principles and rules for the fund’s 
appropriation and expenditure shall be established by law.
The amount of financial support to be appropriated into this fund can be estimated 
on the basis of pegging principle tied to some macroeconomic indicators. For 
example, the amount can be established equivalent to 5% of the GDP. Then the 
financial support of that amount will be automatically transferred to the inter-
budget fund by law.
The tax revenues shared with local budgets like VAT, PIT on wages and salaries, 
minerals royalty, will be placed as a nominal percentage established by law in 
the inter-budget fund.
The fund will become a source of financial support to be channeled to aimags. 
The principles of fund’s expenditure shall be set by law. The transfers will be 
distributed among aimags using a special formula. All this will create conducive 
environment for an aimag revenue source that is transparent, sustainable, 
predictable, and guaranteed.
The Parliament shall only set the principles by law, but not to take up each year 
the income-expenditure report of the Fund. Thus, the central and local budgets 
evolve as inter-dependent, but autonomous. It will present also a useful innovation 
to separate the responsibilities of each budget and to make it transparent. The 
scheme of the inter-budget fund is presented below.
It is appropriate to provide financial support from the national budget to the local 
one in order to keep the balance of budgets. We are proposing to reform the 
current mechanism of financial support into the one that is based on the principle 
57 According to the current legislation, the amount of financial support to aimags is approved each year 
together with the central budget. It is recommended to change this practice and to establish an inter-
budget fund where the tax revenues to be shared with local governments and the financial support 
shall be appropriated.
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Figure 6.1  Chart of the Revenues and Expenditures of the 
Inter-Budget Fund
of financing the difference between standardized expenditure and revenue 
capacity. This would be a transfer for general purpose.
This principle takes into account the following objectives: first, ensuring vertical 
budget balance by financing the difference between the standardized expenditure 
of the administrative unit and its revenue capacity; secondly, ensuring horizontal 
budget balance by financing differences in revenues of administrative units of the 
same level; and thirdly, taking into account local specifics and contexts, when 
implementing any national government programs in the future.        
We propose to use the following formula in allocating financial assistance from 
the central budget to aimag budgets:
Inter-Budget Fund 
Shared Tax 
Revenues 
(VAT) 
Shared Mineral 
Royalty Revenues  
Central Gov’t 
Financial 
Assistance 
Local Budget 
(Aimags)
Distribution 
formula 
Principles to be set 
by law (Dependent 
on macro 
indicators) 
Transferred by law 
Some part flows 
directly into the 
local budget  
Some part flows 
directly into the 
local budget  
Transferred by 
law 
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Financial assistance shall depend on two elements: standardized expenditure 
and revenue capacity. Each element is discussed below.
1. Estimating standardized expenditure 
In calculating the amount of financial assistance to a given aimag, it is necessary 
to take into account standard per capita expense incurred by the aimag for 
providing any given service (expenditure) as well as an average national indicator 
for this expenditure. This can be expressed by the following formula:
G=EEx+Ex
EEiX =(POP)x[(PCSE)  -
i
X (PCSE)  ]
i
na
As currently aimag government is only providing administrative services, we can 
consider that i=1 in this formula. Ni the future, if specific state service duties are 
added to local governments, the above formula can be used for each added 
expenditure and their sum can be used to calculate the amount of financial 
assistance to be provided to the given aimag.
The result of the above formula can be positive, negative or zero. If the result is 
negative, it means that the per capita cost of service provision in that aimag is 
lower than the national average. Therefore, the amount of financial assistance to 
be provided to that aimag shall be less. Conversely, if the result is positive, the 
aimag shall receive commensurate financial assistance. 
In this manner, the formula can be used to calculate standard expenditure for 
each of the local government functions and the sum can be used to calculate the 
amount of financial assistance to provided to or deducted from the aimag. 
The most important consideration in using the formula is realistically establishing 
the standard expenditure               for each service for each administrative 
unit. Currently, the standard per capita expenditure for local government’s 
administrative services has not been established.  In calculating budget expenses 
for this service, the Ministry of Finance controls and calculates each aimag’s 
(1)
i - Amount of assistance to be allocated to or deducted from the 
aimag for a given service 
Population size of the aimag
i - Standard per aimag resident expense for providing the service   
i - National average standard per capita expense for providing the 
service 
Here:
EEiX
(POP)x
(PCSE)iX
(PCSE)  ina
(PCSE)iX
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Local Governor’s Office salaries58 and other expenses, the number of soums, 
the Soum Governor’s Offices’ salaries and other expenses, etc. 
Due to the absence of a standard per capita expenditure for these expenses, the 
actual per capita expenditures differ widely. The 2007 budget performance report 
shows that per capita budget expenditure is the highest in Umnugovi aimag at 
112.4 thousand TG and the lowest in Bayan-Ulgii aimag at 26.8 thousand TG with 
a difference being 85.6 thousand TG.59 National average per capita expenditure 
is 51.4 thousand TG. Widely different per capita budget expenditures stem from 
establishing administrative expenses so as to fit into the Government-imposed 
staffing and expenditure limits, without taking into account costs associated with 
remote distances, population density, etc. Total expenditure for a given aimag can 
be accurately calculated only if the standard per capita expenditure is calculated 
realistically and accurately for that aimag. 
The above example implies that the cost of delivery of  public services to an 
average aimag resident in Umnugovi aimag is 4 times higher than that in Bayan-
Ulgii aimag. However, in reality, the number of soums in both aimags is nearly 
equal: 14 in Bayan-Ulgii and 15 in Umnugovi. Yet given the greater distance 
between the central government and Bayan-Ulgii, the cost of government 
service delivery should be higher in that aimag. On the other hand, service 
delivery costs should be higher in Umnugovi aimag given its territory, which  is 
3.6 times larger than that of Bayan-Ulgii. But in Govi-Altai, which  territory is 
comparable to Umnugovi’s, budget expenditure per capita is twice lower than 
that in Umnu-Govi, at 60.2 thousand TG. This comparison clearly demonstrates 
that the current budget expenditures are not standardized. 
Therefore, it is necessary to develop uniform standards for each service provided 
by the local government. In this case, the mechanism we propose for allocating 
central government assistance shall be most effective. 
It is a critical issue, indeed how the expenditure standards are set. Please make 
it clear, whether you propose input based estimation of standard costs or they 
can be calculated from the present aimag averages? I would vote for the latter 
one. 
2. Estimating revenue capacity
The next element to be used in calculating the amount of financial assistance to 
be provided to a local government is the capacity of that local unit to generate 
revenues. This can be calculated using the following formula:
58 Staffing size and structures of aimag and soum governors’ offices are approved by a Government 
Decree using a uniform template. 
59 This sum includes investment.
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The                    and                   components in this formula can be understood 
as own tax revenue amounts per capita rather than tax revenue bases. 
The       could be positive, negative or zero. If the result is positive, it shall mean 
that the given aimag’s per capita revenue amount is lower than the national 
average, i.e. that the revenue capacity of the aimag is weak and therefore the 
aimag should receive financial assistance. If the result is negative, it shall mean 
that the aimag’s per capita revenue amount is higher than the national average, 
i.e. that the aimag has strong revenue capacity and therefore should receive 
less, if any, assistance. In other words, the principle is to collect revenues from 
relatively well-off administrative units and provide assistance to relatively poor 
administrative units. 
Finally, the total amount of assistance to be provided to a given aimag shall be 
determined on the basis of the sum of the results of both standard expenditure 
(1) and revenue capacity formula calculations (2). 
Below we give an example of the above model of financial assistance using the 
2007 local budget revenues, expenditures and financial assistance performance 
data for each of the aimags.
Aimag population size
National average i tax revenue base amount per capita 
i tax revenue base amount per aimag resident 
National average i tax rate 
¯¿íä:
EiX=(POP)x{[(PCTB)  x t  ]-
i
na (2)
i
na [(PCTB)  x
i
x t  ]}
i
na
The above formula should be used for each type of the local government’s own 
revenue and the sum of the results should be used to calculate the amount of 
financial assistance to be provided to or deducted from the administrative unit. 
Let us assume i=1 in order to simplify the formula for the sake of effective explanation 
and because in Mongolia, the share of any given type of local tax revenue is small 
in the overall local government tax revenue. Furthermore, given that according to 
current laws, the local tax revenue rates are equal throughout the country (essentially 
no differences between aimags), we can leave the          component out of the 
calculation. Then we can convert the formula (2) as follows (3):
(POP)x
(PCTB)ina
(PCTB)ix
t  ina
t  ina
EiX=(POP)x[(PCTB)  -
i
na (PCTB)
i
x (3)
(PCTB) ,ina (PCTB)
i
x
EiX
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• As current budget expenditures are not standardized, an aimag’s per 
capita  expenditure was calculated approximately, taking into account 
the aimag’s distance from the center and regional characteristics of the 
aimag’s location.60
• Aimags’ per capita revenues were calculated by dividing the 2007 aimag 
tax revenue performance by the number of residents.
Current national average per capita budget expenditure is 51.4 thousand 
TG. Aimags’ standard expenditures were calculated by comparison with this 
national average into account. The standard expenditures are listed in column 
(4) of the table provided in Appendix 11.Column (5) contains the total standard 
expenditure. When amounts listed in this column are compared with the actual 
budget performance for 2007, substantial differences shall be observed with 
some of the aimags’ expenditures.
Column (10) lists amounts of financial assistance calculated using the proposed 
method. If the number in column (10) is  positive, the aimag shall receive financial 
assistance of that amount from the central budget. If the number is negative, the 
aimag shall contribute that amount to the central budget. Column (11) shows per 
capita expenditure after  allocation of financial assistance based on the proposed 
method. These figures show that the proposed method of distributing financial 
assistance reduces  differences of per capita expenditure between aimags and 
ensures budget balance more effectively than the current system. Please compare 
column (11) with column (3).
6.3 TRANSFERRING SOME STATE FUNCTIONS AND PROVIDING 
APPROPRIATE FINANCING 
Policy makers and experts interviewed in the course of this research, unanimously 
stated that responsibilities of local self-governing bodies and administrative units 
and their impact on local socio-economic life have declined dramatically due to 
centralization of fiscal power at the level of central government (following the 
passage of the Public Management and Financing Law in 2002). Due to the 
failure to provide the guarantees for financial, budgetary and other rights of local 
self-governance systems, which form the basis of the democratic governance 
enshrined in the Constitution, local government has been overpowered by the 
central government. As a result, local governments’ responsibilities towards their 
citizens have become blurred. For many years, local governments have existed 
purely symbolically, having no real power to make or implement independent 
decisions due to the lack of funds and financial power.
60 In the future, it is necessary to carry out this calculation more carefully based on expenditure factors.
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Members of the local Citizens’ Representatives’ Khurals and Local Governors 
hold that their participation is necessary in delivering education and health 
services to the people. According to the Public Management and Financing Law, 
aimag Governor signs a contract with the Minister of the given sector, thereby 
assuming responsibilities for  delivery of the relevant services. The Governor 
appoints the heads of aimag’s education, culture and health offices based on 
agreements with respective ministers (since 2006). These officials then form 
result-based contracts with the Governor. 
However, although the Governor assumes duties for  delivery of education and 
health services on paper and by law, in reality, the Governor does not have 
any powers to organize these services or to control and manage the budget 
allocated for these services. Aimag agencies receive their budgets directly from 
their respective ministries, bypassing the local budget. Each ministry allocates 
funds for the given services to each aimag using a method of calculating a given 
product’s cost based on variable expenditure norms. 
Before the passage of the Public Management and Financing Law, budgets for 
the above services formed a part of the local budget expenditures. Employees 
of these service sectors reported that during that period, budget allocated for 
the services were often not spent according to their intended purpose and 
budgetary discipline was weak. They reported that with the passage of the Public 
Management and Financing Law, these problems were eliminated and funds are 
now provided continuously, without any interruptions.
Of course, we should not dismiss that there may have been positive effects 
as mentioned above. Nevertheless, we posit that there must be participation of 
local government in the delivery of these services for the following reasons:
1. Political accountability: Education, culture and health service recipients 
are local citizens. Citizens must be provided with an opportunity to hold 
decision-makers politically accountable in relation to  the quality of 
these services. In other words, if the quality of services is bad, citizens 
should be able to hold accountable and refuse to re-elect those decision-
makers, who define service policies, organize their delivery and control 
and manage the budgets.  
 However, in Mongolia, the quality of these services is not linked to political 
accountability mechanisms. The only body that is elected by citizens at 
local level is the Citizens’ Representatives’ Khural. This body is not at all 
involved in  delivery of the above services. The representatives do not 
have any possibility to influence the service policies or control the budget 
and organization of the service delivery. They are relegated to the role 
of independent observers and can only make demands from the outside. 
However, sectoral laws specify the duties and responsibilities of local 
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self-governing bodies and governors in relation to the provision of any 
state service.61 In practice, they are unable to fully implement their duties 
and exercise rights. The local government particularly lacks any powers 
to influence the budgetary decisions related to the service delivery. 
 This situation leads to pro-forma treatment of the issues at hand at the 
expense of citizens’ interests. Thus local citizens are unable to turn to 
their local government to resolve any issues that arise in relation to the 
delivery of state services as all budgetary decisions for these services 
are made by sectoral ministries located in Ulaanbaatar city.  
 Thus, the political accountability mechanism has been weakened to 
such an extent that no matter how many times citizens may elect their 
Citizens’ Representatives’ Khurals and no matter how many times the 
Local Governors are newly appointed, the quality of services citizens 
receive may not improve. In order to make the mechanism of political 
accountability work for the people and render people’s political choices 
meaningful, it is necessary that the local self-governing body assumes 
specific duties and responsibilities in the area of education, culture and 
health services.
2. In the interest of effective distribution, it is best to delegate certain decisions 
related to the delivery of the services to the lowest level administrative 
units. When the service budget is 100% financed from the central budget, 
the local units are interested in maximizing their planned expenditure. 
In other words, the central government is unable to realistically sense 
the actual needs of the local units. Some aimags believe that excessive 
investments were made to local units when the central budget revenues 
were high in 2007. Furthermore, school, hospital and cultural center 
buildings are considered to be local property. Therefore, the fact that 
service costs are fully financed by the central government might be 
serving as a disincentive for local units to improve efficient use of their 
own property.
 Based on the two above-mentioned reasons, we recommend that 
local, particularly soum administrations be put in charge of regular expenditure 
components for education and cultural services. These would include heating, 
electricity, construction and maintenance, support staff salaries and other 
expenses. However, sizeable variable expenses such as teachers’ salaries, their 
social insurance contributions, and expenditures related to lessons and projects 
should be financed from the central government. 
61 Articles 29 and 30 of the The Law on Education (2002) specify the full powers of Citizens’ 
Representatives’ Khurals and Local Governors on education-related issues. In a similar fashion, 
other sectoral laws contain provisions on legal rights and duties of local self-governing bodies and 
local administrations. However, in reality it is impossible to implement these provisions.
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Financing for the above types of expenses should be transferred to local 
administrative units as conditional grants (Ce - conditional grant for education).  
In other words, financial assistance to a given aimag shall consist of general and 
conditional support.
FS = G + Ce + ...
- Financial support  
- General grant  
- Conditional grant for educationCe
FS
G
Here: 
It is recommended to analyze expenditures for each service sector in this 
manner to appropriately define central government and local self-government 
responsibilities and provide relevant financial resources in the form of conditional 
transfers. 
It is possible to conduct detailed analysis of each state service sector and define 
sectoral functions and responsibilities to be transferred to aimag and soum self-
governments and provide financing for those functions and responsibilities as 
special subsidies in the form of conditional transfers. Depending on the specifics 
of the service, the formula for determining standard expenses and amount of 
assistance shall be relatively different. In any case, conditional grants are bound 
to be directly dependent on the number of service recipients.
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7. IMPLEMENTATION
The following steps are proposed towards  implementation of  policy 
recommendations discussed in the previous chapter:
1. Define the scope and elements of reform recommended in the previous 
chapter, which would be politically acceptable 
2. Analyze budget revenue distribution for each aimag within the framework of 
the proposed policy 
3. Develop a new system of distributing local self-government and central 
government functions and responsibilities based on scientific studies and 
accordingly amend relevant laws or develop relevant amendments 
4. Define the scope and areas of legal reform, which shall be required for 
the current budget and tax laws (especially in terms of broadening local 
government’s tax collection powers and redistribution principles)
5. Calculate and establish a standard expenditure for local government functions 
and responsibilities for each aimag
6. Legalize the principles of general and block transfers 
7. Define standards and develop formula for calculating conditional grants for 
educational and cultural services 
8. Carry out a detailed calculation of the inter-budget fund within the current 
and the proposed legal framework 
9. Legalize the principles of the inter-budget fund operations, revenues and 
expenditures 
10. Produce a new law that regulates local budget to systematically address all 
of the above issues
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8. APPENDICES
Appendix 1
Hunting Stock Usage Fees, Animal Hunting and Catching License Fees
(In ‘000 MNT)
 Hunting Stock Usage Fees License Fees for 
Animal Hunting and 
Catching for Private 
Purpose
Animal Types Industrial 
Hunting and 
Catching
Hunting and 
Catching for 
Cultural and 
Science Purposes 
 
One. Mammals
1 Wild (Prjevalski) Horse  800.0  
2 Wild Ass  400.0  
3 Wild Bactrian Camel  740.0  
4 Wild Mountain Sheep  1800.0  
5 Wild Mountain Goat  400.0  
6 Wild Deer  500.0  
7 Elk  560.0  
8 Wild Reindeer  400.0  
9 Musk deer  400.0  
10 Antelope  28.0 28.0
11 Boar  40.0 40.0
12 Mongolian Gazelle  400.0  
13 Goitered Gazelle  300.0  
14 White Gazelle 8.0 8.0 12.0
15 Asian Wild Dog  200.0  
16 Wolf*  18.0  
17 Fox  16.0 16.0
18 Steppe Fox  8.0 8.0
19 Leopard  800.0  
20 Lynx  400.0  
21 Forest Mink  60.0  
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22 Pine Marten  60.0  
23 River Otter  200.0  
24 River Beaver  100.0  
25 Ondatra 1.0 1.0 1.5
26 Wolverine  3.0  
27 Wild Cat  3.6 3.6
28 Badger  22.0 22.0
29 Brown Bear  400.0  
30 Gobi Bear  1000.0  
31 Altai  Marmot 5.0 5.0 7.5
32 Brown Hare, Rabbit  1.2 1.2
33 Raccoon  16.0 16.0
34 Marbled Polecat  0.5 0.5
35 Skunk  0.5 0.5
36 Kolinsky  1.0 1.0
37 Other Weasels  0.5 0.5
38 Dark Squirrel 10.0 10.0 10.0
39 Panther  100.0  
40 Gopher 1.0 1.0 1.5
41 Other ground squirrels 0.3 0.3 0.45
42 Chipmunk 0.3 0.3 0.45
Second. Birds
1 Swan Trumpeter  15.0  
2 Swan Whooper  12.0  
3 Crane Siberian  40.0  
4 Crane Black,  White-
naped
 15.0  
5 Crane Red-crowned  7.5  
6 Bustard Great, 
Houbara
 15.0  
7 Vulture**  20.0 30.0
8 Pelican Dalmatian  30.0  
9 Spoonbill Eurasian  1.8  
10 Stork Black, Oriental  4.0  
11 Goose  8.0  
12 Goose Steppe  8.0  
13 Goose Spoonbill  8.0  
14 Goose Pigmean  8.0  
15 Goose Other species**  2.0  
16 Gull Relict  10.0  
17 Pheasant  6.0  
18 Snow cock Altai  15.0  
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19 Teal Baikal  8.0  
20 Other ducks** and 
water birds**
 3.0  
21 Óõàà øóìáóóð  2.0  
22 Scoter  2.0  
23 Pintail  2.0  
24 Óñíû áóõ øóâóó  2.0  
25 Snow Heron  2.0  
26 Woodcock Asian  2.0  
27 Õèëýí æèã¿¿ðò  2.0  
28 Ýãýë õ¿ðçãýíý  2.0  
29 Barred owl, Ural owl, 
Night owl
 1.8  
30 Saker Falcon  200.0  
31 Gyrfalcon  100.0  
32 Amur Falcon  100.0  
33 Other Falcon Species  90.0  
34 Heath Bird**, 
Grouse**
 1.8  
35 Õºò¿¿**, Quail**, 
õàõèëàã**, Birch 
Partridge**
 1.8  
36 Vulture, Bearded 
Vulture
 20.0  
37 Eagle**, Harrier, Hawk  20.0 20.0 /Eagle 
only/
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Appendix 2 
Rates of Charge for Firewood and Timber of Noncommercial Consumption
(in MNT)
 
 
Types of Tree U
ni
t
Up to 50 km of Transportation Ìîä òýýâðèéí çàé 51-100 êì
Volume of Timber for 
Household Usage Fire-
wood
Volume of Timber for 
Household Usage Fire-
wood
Large Medium Small Large Medium Small
À 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Zone #1
1 Spruce, Fir Ì3 26000 21700 17800 6000 16000 13300 11000 3700
2 Pine Ì3 22900 19100 15700 5300 14100 11700 9600 3300
3 Larch Ì3 18400 15300 12500 4250 11300 9400 7700 2600
4 Birch Ì3 11000 9200 7500 2500 6800 5600 4600 1600
5 Aspen, Poplar Ì3 9400 7800 6400 2200 5800 4800 3900 1400
6 Bush Ì3 - - 6900 600 - - 4600 400
7 Khargana Ì3 - - - 2000 - - - 1400
8 Saxaul òí - - - 9400 - - - 6200
9 Other bushes: Ì3 - - - 3100 - - - 2100
Zone 2
1 Spruce, Fir Ì3 15850 13200 10800 3500 9800 8100 6800 2200
2 Pine Ì3 13900 10800 8900 2900 7800 6500 5300 1800
3 Larch Ì3 11200 9300 7600 2500 6900 5700 4700 1600
4 Birch Ì3 6700 5600 4600 1500 4100 3400 2850 1000
5 Aspen, Poplar Ì3 5700 4750 3900 1300 3500 2900 2400 800
6 Bush Ì3 - - 4700 500 - - 3100 400
Zone 3
1 Spruce, Fir Ì3 13900 11600 9500 3100 6800 5700 4700 1400
2 Pine Ì3 11300 9450 7750 2500 5450 4550 3700 1200
3 Larch Ì3 9800 8150 6700 2200 4800 4000 3300 1000
4 Birch Ì3 5900 4900 4100 1300 2900 2400 2000 600
5 Aspen, Poplar Ì3 5200 4200 3400 1100 2450 2050 1700 500
6 Bush Ì3 - - 4700 500 - - 3100 400
Zone 4
1 Spruce, Fir Ì3 11900 9900 8150 2650 5900 4900 4000 1200
2 Pine Ì3 9900 8300 6800 2200 4900 4000 3350 1000
3 Larch Ì3 7900 6600 5400 1750 3900 3300 2650 800
4 Birch Ì3 4800 4000 3300 1100 2350 2000 1600 500
5 Aspen, Poplar Ì3 4000 3400 2750 950 2000 1650 1350 400
6 Birch Ì3 - - 4000 500 - - 2650 400
     Explanation: A large timber is when the diameter of narrow end is over 25 cm, large 
– if that is between 13.0-24.5 cm, small – if that is between 3.0-12.5.
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 Types of Tree U
ni
t Transportation is over 101 km
Household usage timber size
Firewood
Large Medium Small
À 1 2 3 4 5 6
Zone 1
1 Spruce, Fir Ì3 10150 8300 6950 2800
2 Pine Ì3 9000 7300 6100 2500
3 Larch Ì3 7100 5800 4900 2000
4 Birch Ì3 4300 3500 2900 1200
5 Aspen, Poplar Ì3 3650 3000 2500 1000
6 Birch Ì3 - 4600 3850 400
7 Khargana Ì3 - - - 1400
8 Saxaul òí - - - 6300
9 Other bushes: Ì3 - - - 2100
À 1 2 3 4 5 6
Zone 2
1 Spruce, Fir Ì3 5900 4950 4050 1250
2 Pine Ì3 5200 4350 3600 1100
3 Larch Ì3 4200 3500 2850 900
4 Birch Ì3 2500 2100 1700 500
5 Aspen, Poplar Ì3 2150 1800 1450 450
6 Birch Ì3 - - 3100 300
Zone 3
1 Spruce, Fir Ì3 3900 3250 2650 700
2 Pine Ì3 3000 2500 2100 600
3 Larch Ì3 2750 2300 1900 500
4 Birch Ì3 1650 1400 1150 300
5 Aspen, Poplar Ì3 1400 1200 1000 250
6 Birch Ì3 - - 3150 300
Äºðºâä¿ãýýð ìóæ
1 Spruce, Fir Ì3 2000 1650 1350 600
2 Pine Ì3 1600 1400 1100 500
3 Larch Ì3 1300 1100 900 400
4 Birch Ì3 800 650 550 300
5 Aspen, Poplar Ì3 700 550 450 200
6 Birch Ì3 - - 2700 300
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Appendix 3
Attachment to South Gobi CRH’s
Resolution #9/5 of 26 December 2007
Royalty for Exploitation of Common Minerals
Types of Minerals Unit Royalty Rate (in MNT)
Brick Clay ì3 900
Construction Stone ì3 1125
Sand ì3 1125
Gravel ì3 1200
Limestone (dolomite) ì3 2250
Palisade Stone ì3 1875
Blackearth ì3 900
Ocher, earth dye ì3 1500
Yellow Clay ì3 825
Quartzite ì3 675
Çàíóóæèí /àëåâðîëèò/ ì3 1575
Granite and other magma ì3 1500
Porphyrite (railway bottoming stones) ì3 675
Æóãàí ì3 750
Cretaceous ì3 1500
Õóâèðìàë ÷óëóóëàã ì3 900
Grapholite ì3 1875
Saline ì3 1125
Saltpeter ì3 3000
Salt ì3 3000
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Appendix 4 
Monthly Tax Rate on citizens with production and services whose income size 
is not possible to measure 
Types of Production and 
Services
U
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À 1 2 3 4
1.
Production and sale of fine 
arts, sculpture, engraving, 
souvenir items, decorative 
products, various toys
Planting and sale of decorative 
and room plants and flowers
Engraving and repair of 
souvenir items
3000
1200
2400
2000
900
2000
1000
600
1000
500
200
200
2.
Repair of household electronic 
products, equipment and 
furniture
Repair of radio and television 
sets
Repair of watch
4500
6000
3000
3500
4000
2000
2500
2000
1000
1500
1000
500
3.
Crafting and jewellery works: 
 -  gold and silver
 -  other
 
16000
8000
14000
7000
12000
6000
10000
5000
4.
Teaching, tutorial, training, 
manuscript preparation, 
copying printed materials
2000 1600 1200 1000
5.
Photograph service, contract-
based movie shooting, vedeo 
taping, renting and showing 
VHS/DVD tapes 
Renting audio tapes
Copying and selling of vedeo 
and audio tapes
7000
2400
10000
5500
2000
6000
4000
1600
4000
2000
1000
1000
6.
Gaming business (except 
billiards) 
12000 9000 4500 3000
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7.
Repair and servicing of shoes 
and cloths:
- repair and dyeing
- tailoring and sale
- shoeshining
4000
6000
900
2800
4000
400
2400
3000
200
2000
2500
100
8. Automobile washing 3000 2000
9.
Packaging, loading, unloading, 
transportation and delivery of 
goods and cargo
Servicing by horse cart 
2800
5000
2000
3000
1200
1500 1000
10.
Warehousing goods and raw 
materials
15000 10000
11. Street vendor trading 6000 4000 2000 1000
12. Shop counter trading 6000 4000 2000 1000
13. Foreign exchange trading 25000 15000 10000 5000
14. Fortune teller service 1200 1000 800 400
15.
Retail sales 
(nuts, fruits, milk, yogurt, 
mare’s fermented milk, 
icecream, books, newspapers, 
magazines, firewood, coal, 
technical oil, etc.) 
2400 2000 1600 600
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Appendix 5  
Quotient of inflation-adjusted comparative prices
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
2009 
/òºë/
Average inflation 
level (%)
8,0 0,3 5,1 8,2 12,7 5,1 9,0 23,2 12,0
Inflation index 
compared to 
2001
1,000 1,003 1,054 1,140 1,285 1,351 1,473 1,815 2,033
Inflation index 
compared to 
2008
0,551 0,553 0,581 0,628 0,708 0,744 0,812 1,000 1,120
Explanation:       
Figures from the 2007 Statistical Bulletin of Mongolia and the Mongol Bank’s  
State Monetary Policy Statement for 2009.
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Appendix 9
Aimags’ Tax Revenue Volume for 2006-2008 (in % and ‘000 MNT)
¹ Aimag Tax Revenue 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
1 Real estate tax 19% 12% 8% 6 785,2 8 131,6 8 450,8
2
Vehicle and other 
automobile tax
15% 9% 8% 5 269,5 6 301,7 7 784,2
3 Minerals Roaylty 21% 37% 40% 7 445,3 25 447,7 40 709,6
4 Land Fee 43% 29% 24% 15 507,1 20 065,2 24 757,4
5
Minerals Exploration 
and Mining License 
Fees
0% 12% 19% 0,0 8 096,0 19 819,0
6 Other Taxes 2% 1% 0% 772,2 1 017,6 220,7
 Total 100% 100% 100% 35 779,4 69 059,9 101 741,7
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